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The Transparency Tax
Andrew Keane Woods*
Transparency is critical to good governance, but it also imposes
significant governance costs. Beyond a certain point, excess transparency
acts as a kind of tax on the legal system. Others have noted the burdens
of maximalist transparency policies on both budgets and regulatory
efficiency, but they have largely ignored the deeper cost that
transparency imposes: it constrains one’s ability to support the law while
telling a self-serving story about what that support means.
Transparency’s true tax on the law is the loss of expressive ambiguity.
In order to understand this tax, this Article develops a taxonomy
of transparency types. Typically, transparency means something like
openness. But openness about what—the law’s obligations? The reasons
for the obligations? The actors behind the law? And open to whom? These
are different aspects of what we typically lump together and call
“transparency,” and they present different tradeoffs. With these tradeoffs
in mind, we can begin to make more informed choices about how to draw
the line between maximal and minimal transparency. Of particular note
is the finding that we can demand maximal transparency about the
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law’s obligations without incurring much of the transparency tax. This
runs contrary to the soft law literature, which suggests that vagueness
about obligation is less costly than the alternative. The Article concludes
with a guide for thinking through future transparency tradeoffs.
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INTRODUCTION
Open government is good government, 1 and accordingly we
celebrate when sunlight shines on places that were once dark. 2 We want
to know not only what the law requires of us, but also how it was
created—who met with whom, who said what, and why. 3 Transparency,
it sometimes seems, is a thing we cannot have too much of. 4 Yet
maximal transparency is not optimal; beyond some point, extra
transparency comes at a cost. 5 Some of these costs are well known:
1.
As James Madison noted, “A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.” Letter from
James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) (on file with Library of Congress),
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.20_0155_0159 [https://perma.cc/5ZBX-NZN4]. This view is
reflected more recently in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“[T]ransparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers
and messages.”); see also James R. Hollyer et al., Democracy and Transparency, 73 J. POL. 1191,
1192 (2011) (noting the consensus view that transparency is critical to good governance).
2.
For example, President Obama campaigned on a promise of open government, and one of
his first acts as President was to sign the Open Government Directive, which was welcomed for its
candor. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On First Day, Obama Quickly Sets a New Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2009, at A1. The language embracing open government is almost messianic, typically referring to
light and sun. As Justice Brandeis famously wrote, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”
LOUIS BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92, 92 (1914), https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeiscollection/other-peoples-money-chapter-v [https://perma.cc/F72W-NZ4Z]. Indeed, one of the major
open-government reforms passed in the twentieth century is called the Government in Sunshine
Act. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
3.
Meeting logs are a typical open records request. See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65
DUKE L.J. 1361, 1407 (2016) (“A sampling of these request letters reveals a pattern of asking for
all communications, including meetings, visitor logs, and appointments between the FTC and each
individual or entity named.”).
4.
The Obama Presidency took extraordinary steps to emphasize openness, in part due to
its use of technology to make large datasets publicly available. See Making Open and Machine
Readable the New Default for Government Information, Exec. Order No. 13642, 78 Fed. Reg.
28,111 (May 9, 2013) (instructing the Director of OMB to issue an open policy for government
data). Yet the Obama administration was roundly criticized for not being open enough. See Alex
Howard, How Should History Measure the Obama Administration’s Record on Transparency?,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Sept. 2, 2016, 12:35 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/
2016/09/02/how-should-history-measure-the-obama-administrations-record-on-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/LHY4-2FRS].
5.
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012), recently saw its fiftieth
anniversary, which prompted several critical appraisals of the open government act. See, e.g.,
David Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1097, 1156 (2017) (arguing that when holistically analyzing FOIA, the act “systematically skews
the production of information toward commercial interests and facilitates powerful antiregulatory
agendas”); Cass Sunstein, Output Transparency v. Input Transparency (May 25, 2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2826009
[https://perma.cc/GL3G-2JN9] (arguing that the government should freely disclose “output”
information, but should be guarded about disclosing “input” information); Program: FOIA@50
Conference, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCHOOL (June 2–4, 2016), https://perma.cc/XQ8X-645C
(comparing different perspectives on FOIA and proposing how to improve FOIA and the future of
open government).
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sunshine laws can be enormously expensive to administer, requiring
recording procedures, disclosure procedures, appeal procedures, and so
on. 6 Transparency can also impair candor in decisionmaking. 7
But even if these costs could somehow be wished away, a deeper
cost would remain. Transparency’s true toll is that it narrows the range
of possible interpretations about what the law means. 8 Too much
transparency reduces ambiguity about what values the law expresses,
thereby reducing the size of the pool of potential supporters. Opacity,
conversely, maximizes one’s ability to support the law while posturing
about what that support means. 9 Consider a few brief examples that
illustrate the point.
Suppose that the President announces a policy that is obviously
bad—a policy that reduces overall welfare, degrades the Union, and so
on. One naturally hopes that the President changes course. But suppose
that this President is especially sensitive to public opinion, and fears
being criticized for changing his mind. Given these constraints, is it
more likely that he reverses course in broad daylight, or after discussing
the issue privately? For several reasons, it seems more likely that
private meetings would be more productive. We should want the
President to be able to characterize his meetings in a way that allows
him to save face, all while doing the right thing; enough opacity of the
right sort gives him wide latitude to characterize his private
6.
See, e.g., FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT FED. ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2016) (summarizing these significant costs associated with complying with
the Freedom of Information Act); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 114TH
CONG., FOIA IS BROKEN (Comm. Print 2016) (summarizing the backlog of requests and the high
costs of complying with the Freedom of Information Act); Zachary Pall, The High Costs of Costs:
Fees as Barriers to Access Within the United States and Canadian Freedom of Information
Régimes, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 599, 629 (2009) (proposing a five-dollar charge for
FOIA requests in order to compensate the government for the cost of production).
7.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”).
8.
I refer here to the law’s expressive capacity. Beyond imposing obligations, law may also
make a statement about values. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (“In this article I explore the expressive function of law—the function
of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly.”). Scholars have explored
law’s expressive capacity in a number of areas. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism:
A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309 (2000) (federalism);
Yuval Feldman, The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation,
and Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177 (2009) (trade secrets); Alex Geisinger & Michael
Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77 (2007) (public
international law); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (2000) (constitutional law); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996) (criminal law); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Expressive Dimension of EU
Criminal Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2012) (European Union law).
9.
As we will see, this can happen through a number of distinct mechanisms. See infra Part
III.
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decisionmaking process and announce, perhaps selectively, whom he
consulted. As James Madison said about the closed-door Constitutional
Convention: “Had the members committed themselves publicly at first,
they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to
maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself
obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their
propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.” 10
It is for precisely these reasons that the International
Committee for the Red Cross (“ICRC”) meets with armed combatants
behind closed doors. 11 If the ICRC hopes to convince an armed group to
reduce civilian casualties, it may only be able to do so if it leaves the
armed group enough room to manage the optics of its newfound
compliance with international norms. 12 Perhaps the armed group
agrees to improve targeting practices because it hopes to win the hearts
and minds of the local population, and the ICRC has experts that could
advise the rebel group on just that. But for the rebel group, it would be
costly to appear to bow to international pressure. They hope to comply
with humanitarian law without appearing to do so. So they publicly
announce that the Red Cross is a wicked, Western organization with no
local legitimacy. The Red Cross’s experts smile and say nothing,
knowing that semitransparency is critical to their success at enforcing
international law. 13
Perhaps these examples are too exotic or sui generis, so consider
a final example. The Supreme Court regularly settles hugely important
legal debates by fiat—that is, by issuing summary orders that offer no
justification and no vote tally. 14 Some, not surprisingly, find this
troubling. 15 But there are good reasons why Justices might issue an
10. Indeed, Madison suggests that the constitution would never have occurred had the
debates been public. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 479 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
11. Steven R. Ratner, Behind the Flag of Dunant: Secrecy and the Compliance Mission of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297, 302–06
(Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013) (describing the critical role that secrecy plays in the
ICRC’s success gaining compliance with the laws of war in the absence of strong enforcement
mechanisms).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. A growing number of the Supreme Court’s orders arrive without any explanation or
justification. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1, 3–4 (2015) (describing the Court’s use of orders and stays without opinions); see also
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Actions Are Monumental, but the Why of Its Reasoning Often
Missing, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
supreme-courts-actions-are-monumental-but-the-why-of-its-reasoning-often-missing/2014/10/12/
ca1ccc9c-4fca-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html [https://perma.cc/R4QM-5NMT].
15. Baude, supra note 14, at 26–27 (summarizing criticisms of the Court’s summary reversal
practice—reversals without justifications—that go back half a century).
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opinion without explaining the reasoning, not all of them nefarious. For
example, suppose that two Justices can only agree to the proper
resolution of a case if they do not articulate their reasons; they agree on
the outcome, but on different grounds. Deciding the case by summary
order allows them to strike an incompletely theorized agreement—they
achieve the right outcome, but without saying why. 16 Incompletely
theorized agreements are not possible in a totally transparent regime.
These are brief illustrations of a simple idea: there are times
when optimal law and policy emerge in a less-than-fully-transparent
regime. The assumption in these examples—an assumption that may
or may not withstand closer examination—is that demanding more
transparency impedes the optimal outcome. Beyond some point, then,
extra transparency comes at a cost. The reader likely has many
questions about these examples. Are they really the same, or can they be
distinguished? Even if transparency is harmful in these cherry-picked
examples, is it harmful overall? Even if it is harmful in many scenarios,
is it not worse to have too little transparency than too much? And so on.
The aim of this Article is to develop a framework for thinking about
transparency that will help begin to answer these questions.
This task involves, first, drawing some distinctions between
different kinds of transparency. In particular, the Article draws
distinctions between four related but discrete concepts: (1) obligation
transparency (what does the rule require?); (2) justification
transparency (why this rule?); (3) publicity transparency (who knows
about the rule?); and (4) attribution transparency (who is behind the
rule?). Scholars often emphasize publicity, suggesting that
transparency means something like “not secret”—that legal rules be
known to the public, or at least that they be publicized, or at the very
least that they be published. 17 Some go a step further to suggest that
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735–
36 (1995) (“[W]ell-functioning legal systems often tend to adopt a special strategy for producing
agreement amidst pluralism. Participants in legal controversies try to produce incompletely
theorized agreements on particular outcomes. They agree on the result and on relatively narrow
or low-level explanations for it. They need not agree on fundamental principal.”). All incompletely
theorized agreements feature some degree of opacity; not all opacity, however, is aimed at
achieving an incompletely theorized agreement. The same is true for Rawls’ notion of overlapping
consensus. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133–72 (expanded ed. 2005).
17. David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154,
169–72 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996) (cataloging the distinctions between varying degrees of
publicity); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29–44 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999)
(“[T]he grand security of securities is publicity . . . whatever is done by anybody, being done before
the eyes of the universal public.”); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 49–51 (1969) (arguing
that with few exceptions, law should be published). Luban interrogates Kant’s hypothetical
publicity test, which goes as follows: “All actions relating to the right of other human beings are
wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity.” IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 381
(1795), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/357/0075_Bk.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4FD-Z6NV].
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publicity transparency requires not only that the rule be public but also
that its reasons be public. 18 Whether one agrees with this, it is worth
noting first that the rule’s obligations, its justification, its source, and
its publicity are four descriptively distinct components of transparency.
These four elements of transparency are severable. There are
times when the rule is unclear or obscured (incomplete obligation).
Then there are times when the rule itself is clear and widely known,
but the reason is obscured (incomplete justification). For example, if the
law requires that, “all cars must stop at a stop sign,” this rule may be
motivated by concerns over safety, or it may be the work of the local
small business lobby, which hopes to increase foot traffic. The reason
behind the rule is obscured, even though the rule’s obligations are not.
It is incomplete to say the rule is “transparent” without capturing both
of these meanings. We might also ask: “Transparent to whom?” The
rule’s obligations and justification may be clear as day, but only to some.
When the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court holds a hearing on a
request for a wiretap, for example, it does so behind closed doors. 19 But
the participants are unlikely to say that it is transparent to them. The
point is that transparency is something that can only be measured with
a particular audience in mind (incomplete publicity). Then there are
times when a rule emerges with clear and definite justification, and a
large audience, but the source of the rule remains unclear (incomplete
attribution). For example, when the Supreme Court denies a petition
for certiorari, a regulatory act of some consequence, we rarely know how
the individual Justices voted. It matters that the order comes from the
Supreme Court, of course, but it also matters which Justices voted for
or against granting the writ.
Within each type of transparency, we might make further
distinctions. Consider attribution transparency. There is a meaningful
difference between official attribution and unofficial attribution (such
as a planted leak). There is a difference between deep attribution
18. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (rev. ed. 1999) (emphasizing the need
for both public rules and public reasoning). Luban interprets Kant’s publicity test to include both
the rule and the reason as well, suggesting that the test requires rulemakers to ask: “Could I still
get away with this if my action and my reason for doing it are known?” Luban, supra note 17, at
156.
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2012); see also ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43362, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS:
PROCEDURAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES 4 (2014):
In light of the sensitive nature of its docket, the FISA courts operate largely in secret
and in a non-adversarial fashion. Court sessions are held behind closed doors, are
generally held ex parte with the government as the only party presenting arguments to
the court, and rarely are its opinions released.
(citations omitted).
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(identifying an individual source) and shallow attribution (identifying
an institutional source). And there is a difference between attribution
about the source of the law and attribution about the target.
With these differences in transparency types in mind, we can
begin to assess their relative costs and benefits. It may be possible that
optimal policy involves maximal transparency of one sort or another,
but not all four. That is, perhaps many of the benefits of openness can
be achieved without all of the costs, by attempting to maximize one type
of transparency over another. This Article undertakes this assessment
with the benefit of a growing body of political science research about the
benefits of opacity (or, conversely, the harms of transparency). 20 In
particular, this literature has shown that agents perform better for
their principals when some of their actions are conducted behind closed
doors. 21 One potential explanation for this finding is that the agents
need not posture for their principals and so they can make better
decisions. 22 This Article provides another explanation: agents can strike
deals that benefit the principal but which might be unsavory for the
principal to admit to publicly. 23
The focus of this Article is on assessing the expressive costs of
demanding
maximal
transparency,
costs
that
are
often
underappreciated. That does not mean, however, that those costs are
not outweighed by many benefits of transparency—only that they merit
consideration. This is not an argument that the U.S. government is
currently too transparent or that, on balance, one ought to prefer
opacity to transparency. Nor is it an argument against transparencyenhancing policies. Indeed, one of the Article’s conclusions is that it may
make sense to err on the side of demanding excess transparency,
because without full information the harms of too little transparency
may be greater than the harms of too much transparency. 24 We also
20. See, e.g., David Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference?: The Example of the
European Council of Ministers, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 164, 166
(Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006) [hereinafter Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a
Difference?] (developing a model for thinking about the costs of transparency in international
relations); David Stasavage, Polarization and Publicity: Rethinking the Benefits of Deliberative
Democracy, 69 J. POLITICS 59, 60 (2007) [hereinafter Stasavage, Polarization and Publicity]
(“Publicity of debate may prompt representatives to use their actions or statements as signals that
they are being faithful to constituent interests.”). This literature largely cuts against the
traditional findings, in political science and economics, that transparency makes agents perform
better. See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY
(2008).
21. Andrea Prat, The More Closely We Are Watched, The Better We Behave?, in
TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE?, supra note 20, at 101–02 (noting that despite
the assumption in much of economics, agents perform better when transparency is reduced).
22. Id.
23. See infra Section III.B.
24. See infra Part V.
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may get less transparency than we demand: history suggests that
regulators are underincentivized to be transparent and so it may make
sense to generally demand more transparency than one wants, even if
that means that sometimes the result is too much transparency.
Assessing the costs of excess transparency is difficult because
these costs are much less salient than the costs of too little
transparency. An open records policy that leads rulemakers to privilege
optics over substance is unlikely to generate any headlines; it may not
even be noticeable. But when political leaders engage in self-dealing
behind closed doors, the harm is tangible and the scandal makes for
front page news. There is an asymmetry in the way we assess
transparency—a sort of transparency loss aversion 25—that leads us to
fear the loss of transparency but not the costs of having it. This
asymmetry is worth noting because it might suggest that we
underinvestigate the costs of transparency policies.
This Article begins with descriptive claims. Part I shows that
opacity is a regular and widely accepted feature of our current legal
regime; we find opacity in legislation, adjudication, and enforcement.
Part II provides a taxonomy of transparency types. In Part III, I argue
that maximal transparency is not the same thing as optimal
transparency. Welfare is often maximized by dialing down one of the
dimensions of transparency. In Part IV, I explore some design
implications. While regime designers tend to focus on modulating law’s
obligations—by softening its terms or enforcement mechanisms—they
may be wiser instead to focus on other types of transparency. And
finally, in Part V, I assess how and when regime designers might make
better tradeoffs among different kinds of transparency types. This Part
offers several distinctions that—regardless of the persuasiveness of my
normative argument—ought to be relevant to any attempt to draw a
sensible line between maximal and minimal transparency.
I. TRANSPARENCY TODAY
We tend to draw a somewhat haphazard line between open
government and closed government: we might demand that the Office

25. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A ReferenceDependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1041 (1991) (describing how people tend to prefer avoiding
a loss to an equivalent gain). Another way to describe this is that losses in transparency are more
salient and therefore we focus on them, given the availability heuristic. Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.,
Sept. 1973, at 207, 211–12.

Woods_Galley (Do Not Delete)

10

1/11/2018 2:58 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1:1

of Legal Counsel release its legal opinions, 26 but allow our diplomats to
negotiate behind closed doors. 27 Or we might rail against the secrecy of
the Star Chamber, 28 but allow the Supreme Court to issue opinions that
disclose neither their reasons nor their author. 29 Here are a few
examples that illustrate the simple point that Americans already accept
a great deal less than maximal transparency in our legal system, and
we do so at every level of the regulatory process.
A. Semitransparent Rulemaking
Until relatively recently, members of Congress voted on pending
legislation by anonymous ballot. 30 Before 1970, the House of
Representatives voted by unrecorded teller votes—the vote totals were
recorded, but the individual votes were not. Committee voting was even
less transparent: meetings were private; votes unrecorded; and even the
fact of a vote could be kept a secret. 31
This changed when the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
was passed. 32 That bill called for, among other things, amending the
Rules of the House of Representatives to reflect the following change:

26. Ryan Lizza, The Lawyer and the Kill-List Memo, NEW YORKER (May 22, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-lawyer-and-the-kill-list-memo
[https://perma.cc/P3KY-GN9Y] (describing the public campaign to release the Office of Legal
Counsel memo authorizing the use of deadly force against an American armed combatant
overseas); see also N.Y. Times v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 144 (2d Cir. 2014) (dismissing
a FOIA lawsuit to compel the publication of the memo).
27. The view that diplomacy necessitates something less than full transparency dates to the
earliest days of the republic. Thomas Jefferson was a firm believer in secret diplomacy, often using
private citizens to ferry messages that he feared might otherwise become public. STEPHEN F.
KNOTT, SECRET AND SANCTIONED: COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 80–82
(1996) (describing Jefferson’s at times laborious efforts at secrecy). Thomas Jefferson also
explicitly noted that not all government affairs ought to be public. Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to George Hay (June 17, 1807), in 3 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 529, 529 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., federal ed. 1904) (“All nations have found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct
of their affairs, some of these proceedings, at least, should remain known to their executive
functionary only.”).
28. LORD DENNING, LANDMARKS IN THE LAW 61–62 (1984).
29. See Baude, supra note 14 (describing the Court’s use of orders and stays without
opinions).
30. See Paul J. Quirk & Joseph Hinchliffe, The Rising Hegemony of Mass Opinion, in LOSS
OF CONFIDENCE: POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE 1970S, at 30–31 (David Brian Robertson ed., 1998)
(noting that prior to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the House of Representatives
voted primarily by unrecorded teller votes and held committee meetings outside of the public’s
eye).
31. Id.
32. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 102–04, 111–17, 84 Stat.
1140, 1143–45, 1151–55 (1970). The bill was developed by the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress and was part of an overall effort to modernize congressional procedures.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART &
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The result of each rollcall vote in any meeting of any committee shall be made available
by that committee for inspection by the public at reasonable times in the offices of that
committee. Information so available for public inspection shall include a description of the
amendment, motion, order, or other proposition and the name of each Member voting for
and each Member voting against such amendment, motion, order, or proposition, and
whether by proxy or in person, and the names of those Members present but not voting. 33

Similar changes applied to the Senate. 34 Related changes
included public notice of hearings, 35 open hearings, 36 and broadcasting
of committee hearings. 37 This meant that a Senator could no longer vote
for or against a new law without publicly expressing a commitment that
might upset one constituent or another (thereby increasing the chances
that special interests could monitor representatives’ voting behaviors).
As Senator Packwood put it:
When we’re in the sunshine, as soon as we vote, every trade association in the country
gets out their mailgrams and their phone calls in twelve hours, and complains about the
members’ votes. But when we’re in the back room, the senators can vote their conscience.
They vote for what they think is the good of the country. Then they can go out to the
lobbyists and say: “God, I fought for you. I did everything I could. But Packwood just
wouldn’t give in, you know. It’s so damn horrible.” 38

The Council of the European Union is even less transparent than
the U.S. Congress. The Council’s meeting minutes are sealed from the
public, and the group often arrives at policy decisions by consensus,
without revealing how each minister voted. 39 The Council’s lack of
transparency has been heavily criticized. 40 How can the citizens in
home states monitor their agents in the Council if deliberations are kept
secret and individual ministers do not have to put their names on
Council policy? 41

ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1951-2000/The-LegislativeReorganization-Act-of-1970/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AG6J-GCWV].
33. § 104(b), 84 Stat. at 1145.
34. § 104(a), 84 Stat. at 1145.
35. § 111, 84 Stat. at 1151.
36. § 112, 84 Stat. at 1151.
37. § 115, 84 Stat. at 1153.
38. Luban, supra note 17, at 187 (citing JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY,
SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX
REFORM 260 (1987)).
39. See Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference?, supra note 20, at 170–72. As I
explain below, the European Central Bank has a similar policy to the Council. See infra note 134
and accompanying text.
40. See UK Bid to End Secret EU Debates, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4218776.stm [https://perma.cc/RZ7S-HMXC] (“Critics have long
complained that the Council’s practice of debating laws behind closed doors puts the EU on a par
with the worst dictatorships.”).
41. Much of the literature on this problem focuses on the principal-agent problem associated
with reduced transparency. See, e.g., Prat, supra note 21 (noting that despite the assumption in
much of economics, agents perform better when transparency is reduced).
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But despite its obvious costs, the closed-door consensus policy
has also been defended by those who say it serves several useful
functions. First, it may allow legislators to pursue policies that benefit
the electorate, despite the political pressures of a special interest.
Meeting privately, and shielding any individual legislator’s vote by only
issuing a group decision, may relieve some of the pressure to posture
for certain constituents. 42 Second, these closed-door and group-vote
rules could prevent legislators from posturing altogether, which may
lead to better outcomes on balance. 43 Finally, shielding deliberations
may allow legislators to form coalitions they otherwise might not form.
For example, legislators from two rival political parties might be wary
of publicly appearing to align on any issue, even on some unrelated
matter where both sides could benefit. In this scenario, shielding the
legislators behind the law could provide them with the cover needed to
forge productive coalitions. The benefits of anonymity may be especially
beneficial in the early stages of the law’s development, when parties
may have different reasons for supporting a bill or when coalitions are
just being built.
B. Semitransparent Adjudication
On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court issued five identical
orders blocking the implementation of President Obama’s clean energy
plan. 44 The rulings arrived without an explanation. The court simply
stated that the stays had been granted “pending disposition of the
applicants’ petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and disposition of the applicants’
petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought.” 45 The public was
left guessing about the reasons. 46
This is not uncommon: an increasing number of the Supreme
Court’s orders and stays are not accompanied by a decision indicating
42. Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference?, supra note 20, at 166 (“[T]ransparency
can also have costs involving increased incentives for representatives to posture and to ignore
private beliefs about appropriate policies.”).
43. Id. at 168–69 (describing the “political correctness effect” on representatives’ voting
behavior).
44. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016); Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct.
999 (2016); Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016); North Dakota v. EPA, 136 S. Ct.
999 (2016); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 998 (2016).
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. See Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
9,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/
[https://perma.cc/5BZP-LVGZ] (suggesting several alternative reasons for why the stays were
granted).
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the reason for the Court’s judgment. 47 Indeed, one recent study suggests
that only three percent of all federal trial court decisions are explained
in a published opinion. 48
Without a statement of reasons, a court’s ruling may at best
signal an ambiguous message rather than a clear commitment to any
particular principle. Suppose, for example, that the Court had resolved
Obergefell without issuing an opinion. Would the case be celebrated as
a commitment by the court to the principle of the fundamental value of
marriage as it is today? 49 Perhaps. But it would also leave the door open
to a number of competing interpretations. The Court’s ruling without
an opinion might be explained as a symbol of the Court’s commitment
to gay rights or, just as compellingly, as a statement by the Court about
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As Bobbitt and Calabresi note, when
courts do not give reasons for their decisions, they leave more room for
interpretation. 50
This lack of reason-giving has been heavily criticized. 51 Reasongiving is traditionally thought to be a critically important component of
a legitimate legal system, 52 and even to the liberal legal order. 53 But
there are good reasons that a court might choose not to share its
reasoning. Perhaps the best-known justification for not giving reasons
is Sunstein’s idea that by deciding the case but not expounding too
47. See Baude, supra note 14, at 14 (“Not only are we often ignorant of the Justices’ reasoning,
we often do not even know the votes of the orders with any certainty.”).
48. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 681, 710 (2007) (noting that of 5,736 recorded judicial actions, only 178 had accompanying
opinions).
49. See Editorial, A Profound Ruling Delivers Justice on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2015, at A20 (“The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural
and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now
manifest.” (quoting Justice Kennedy)).
50. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 211 n.39 (1978):
When a court is working its way toward a new doctrine but does not yet know which of
various competing principles will be appropriate, the opinion which does not stand for
anything, if used sparingly, may be the least willful step the court can take. It may
permit the court to test the water without imposing its will on later courts.;
see also Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1755:
Whenever a court offers reasons, there is a risk of future regret—not simply because
the court may be confined in a subsequent case and thus have to avoid inconsistency,
but because the reasons offered in case A may turn out, on reflection, to generate a
standard, a principle, or a rule that collides with the court’s considered judgment about
case B.
51. See Baude, supra note 14, at 9–10 (questioning the “consistency and transparency of the
Court’s processes[,]” and stating that reform could add to the “substantive legitimacy” of certain
decisions).
52. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19–20 (1959) (summarizing the importance of neutral and general reason-giving in the law).
53. See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 216–20 (arguing that citizens demand of each other a public
reasoning of their decisions).
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much on the principles that inform the court’s reasoning, courts
engender incompletely theorized agreements—agreements between
people who can converge on the particular outcome of a case, but may
disagree about their reasons why. 54
Not giving reasons is far from the only way that courts are less
than fully transparent. Courts also regularly issue per curiam opinions,
which may be fully reasoned but which do not reveal the author of the
opinion. 55 Anonymity in judicial decisionmaking has attracted far less
scholarly attention than failures to give reasons, but it could
conceivably be critiqued for the same reasons. Transparency advocates
presumably want to know not only which court decided the case, but
how each judge voted and why. Yet anonymity might enable judges—
and other collective bodies—to regulate as a group, without putting
their individual names on the line. 56 When the Ninth Circuit recently
granted an injunction blocking the President’s executive order barring
immigrants from seven majority-Muslim countries, the court did so in
a per curiam opinion. 57 One of the effects this had was to suggest to the
public that the court spoke as one voice; the expressive impact of the
court’s ruling was different than if the court had issued an opinion
signed by the individual judges. 58 It also shielded the judges from
potential recrimination by the President. 59
C. Semitransparent Enforcement
In early 2016, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
approached Apple for assistance in accessing the contents of a suspected
terrorist’s phone, the technology firm found itself in a bind. 60 Apple has
54. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1735–36 (noting that this “agreement on relative
particulars . . . is an important source of social stability and an important way for diverse people
to demonstrate mutual respect”).
55. Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per
Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2012) (describing how the Court’s use of per curiam
opinions is an attempt to frame how an opinion is received).
56. See id. (arguing that per curiam opinions give judges some anonymity).
57. Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141, 2017 WL 469608, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017).
58. Stephen I. Vladeck, President Trump Can Rant, Tweet, and Make Threats, but the Courts
Are Immune to His Antics, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017, 11:52 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/courts-immune-president-trump-antics-article1.2968936 [https://perma.cc/LH9C-ECY5] (arguing that the court’s use of a per curiam opinion
made it clear “that all that followed was spoken in one, collective voice”).
59. See id. (noting that the per curiam opinion not only allowed the judges to speak as one
voice, but also “den[ied] the President the opportunity to single them out individually”).
60. See Katie Benner & Nicole Perlroth, How Tim Cook, in iPhone Battle, Became a Bulwark
for Digital Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2016, at A1 (noting that Apple has had difficulty
reconciling governmental requests for Apple product users’ personal information and the users’
right to privacy).
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a long history of assisting law enforcement and generally takes great
pains to comply with the law. 61 Yet Apple’s customers are increasingly
wary of government efforts to access their data. 62 So Apple asked the
FBI to make its request under seal; 63 if the order were sealed, Apple
could comply with its legal obligations without “making a statement”
that might upset its customers. 64
When Apple asked the FBI to make its request for assistance
under seal, it was not asking for something unprecedented. 65 In fact,
law enforcement agents regularly attempt to enforce the law quietly—
thereby without forcing the subject of the enforcement action to signal
a broader commitment to some principle associated with the law. In the
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI increasingly
relied on Patriot Act authority66 to issue National Security Letters—
orders that compelled the production of evidence but prevented the
target from telling anyone about the order. 67 The use of National
Security Letters is routine; one estimate puts their use at thirty
thousand letters issued per year. 68 The secret law enforcement orders
were considered critical to a number of counterterrorism operations
because they enabled the FBI to enforce the law with regard to a
particular target, without signaling to a wider community that target’s
cooperation with the government. 69 This decoupling of obligation and
signal is common in civil actions, too. Settlement agreements are
typically confidential because the parties may be willing to accept
61. See Shane Harris, Apple Unlocked iPhones for the Feds 70 Times Before, DAILY BEAST
(Feb. 17, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/02/17/apple-unlockediphones-for-the-feds-70-times-before.html [https://perma.cc/LJR7-7M48] (noting that Apple “since
2012, had been providing its customers’ information to the FBI and the NSA[,]” and “has unlocked
phones for authorities at least 70 times since 2008”).
62. See Benner & Perlroth, supra note 60 (writing that the information Apple users store on
devices has become increasingly personal).
63. Id. (“Apple had asked the F.B.I. to issue its application for the tool under seal. But the
government made it public, prompting Mr. Cook to go into bunker mode to draft a response . . . .”).
64. This is Cass Sunstein’s definition of legal expressivism. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at
2024 (“In this Article I explore the expressive function of law—the function of law in ‘making
statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly.”).
65. See Benner & Perlroth, supra note 60 (noting that Apple has worked with the FBI in the
past).
66. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 119, 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006).
67. See Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/05/AR2005110501366.html
[https://perma.cc/ER3M-XWFB] (noting that recipients of National Security Letters must provide
specific personal information and are “permanently barred from disclosing the letters”).
68. Id.
69. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 48 (2007),
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0703b/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKA5-3DDP].
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certain obligations—pay for the damage they caused, apologize to their
victims—but without making a public statement and incurring broader
reputational costs. 70
II. TRANSPARENCY TYPES
The examples above show that the legal system is far from
maximally transparent. But more importantly, it is semitransparent in
different ways. A legislature that does not record its votes may be public
about the law’s obligations and the reasons behind it, but not attribute
the individual actors behind the law’s passage. A court that issues a
summary order may establish clear obligations, which can be
attributable to the named judges behind the decision, but if the court
does not issue an opinion it may be difficult to divine the reason for the
obligation. National Security Letters and other forms of quiet
enforcement may be transparent about the obligation imposed, the
reason for it, and even attribute the source of the obligation, but only
make this known to the recipient of the letter—not to the wider public.
This offers the beginnings of an analytic framework for parsing
four different aspects of transparency. The law is maximally
transparent when it is: (1) clearly defined; (2) clearly justified; (3)
maximally public; and (4) specifically attributable. Transparency can
be increased or decreased along each of these dimensions.

70. See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 878 (2007) (“Part of the liability (L) to defendants is
reputational cost (LR), the cost of undesirable public knowledge of a verdict or settlement it pays.”);
see also Gregg Stevens & Lorin Subar, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is a Virtual
Necessity, GPSOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2012, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/
november_december2012privacyandconfidentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_vir
tual_necessity.html [https://perma.cc/5WEJ-AUDV] (providing several reasons litigants could
prefer confidentiality agreements).
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TABLE 1: TRANSPARENCY TYPES

Obligation

Justification

Publicity

Attribution

More Transparent

Less Transparent

Clear Rule
Rule is clear, specific,
understandable

Unclear Rule
Rule is vague, ambiguous, or
otherwise hard to interpret

Clear and Specific Reason
Statement is clear enough
to suggest a particular
principle or set of
principles to which one is
committing
Large Audience
Public statement:
addressed to everyone,
known to everyone
Attributable & Committed
Party’s identity is known
and their commitment to
the principle being
expressed is clear

Unspecified Reason
Statement is so vague or
ambiguous that it does not
articulate a particular
principle or set of principles to
which one is committing
Small Audience
Private statement: tonal effects
for in-group only
Anonymous and/or
Uncommitted
Party’s identity is obscured
and/or they express no
commitment to the principle
being expressed

These four dimensions are illustrated in Table 1 above. Each of
these variables represents a relative value that lies somewhere on a
spectrum from open to closed.
This Part examines each of these dimensions in isolation,
keeping in mind that each is a part of a whole. For example, while the
level of law’s publicity may have a direct effect on transparency, it is
not the only variable at play; nonpublic statements may still be
transparent, just as some public statements may be opaque. Rather, the
point is that if the law is otherwise transparent—that is, it articulates
a clear obligation and a commitment to a particular justifying principle
on behalf of an identifiable actor—then one way to make it less
transparent is to make it less public. The same is true for the other
dimensions of transparency. Even if the law publicly articulates a clear
principle, it will not be maximally transparent if it does not also
communicate a commitment on behalf of someone or something.
Finally, even if an agreement is public and conveys a commitment to a
clear set of obligations, it will not be maximally transparent if it does
not also articulate a commitment to clear and particular principles.
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A. Obligation (Transparency About What)
One aspect of transparency is clarity about the rules and the
obligations they impose. There are many ways that rulemakers can be
more or less transparent about the obligation itself. The classic
distinction between rules and standards is instructive. Suppose that the
law relies on a broad standard like “drive safely.” This obligation is less
transparent in a certain sense than a rule that requires drivers to “drive
55 miles per hour or below.” How is the driver to know in the first
instance what, specifically, the law requires? On its face, the law is less
than fully open about its strictures. Vagueness, then, is a means of
being less open about what the law requires. 71
Another way that law might be less than fully transparent about
its obligations is if there is large gap between what the law says it
requires, and how it is enforced on the streets. For example, a speed
limit of 65 miles per hour that is not, in fact, ever enforced at that limit
is not entirely transparent about what sorts of obligations it imposes on
its subjects. The subject of the law does not know everything they might
know about the law from its publication; more information is needed.
Perhaps the actual obligation imposed by the law is to drive slower than
75 miles per hour; beyond that limit, a ticket will be issued. In this
scenario, predictable enforcement of a speed limit that is different from
the published limit suggests that the law is less than fully transparent
about its obligations.
The law can also be less than fully transparent about its
obligations if it is unevenly and erratically enforced. For example, most
pedestrians would be surprised to receive a ticket for jaywalking—
because although most people know that there are rules against
jaywalking, they are so rarely enforced that the actual obligation seems
to be different than what is written. Perhaps the obligation is only to
avoid jaywalking on days that the police are ticketing people; perhaps
not. But the law, on its face, tells its subjects little about its obligations.
Transparency of obligation, then, is about how completely and
openly the law states its constraints—which may be a matter of
specificity, determinacy, and clarity about enforcement. If the law is
less than fully clear about those things, it is not maximally transparent
as to its obligations. As the next Section shows, the law’s transparency
of obligation is largely independent of how much it says about why it
exists, who it is aimed at, and on whose behalf. Indeed, if the obligation
71. Vagueness does not always mean that the law is unclear as to what it requires—
sometimes the obligation really is vague, just as the law is. But very often, the de jure law is vague
but its de facto enforcement is not.
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is vague, then people may have more latitude to articulate their own
reasons for complying because there may be a wider range of acceptable
behavior—they might be able to find a suitable behavior that is
compliant.
B. Justification (Transparency About Why)
Another way that the law can be more or less transparent is the
extent to which it clearly explains what principle justifies its
obligations. For example, when a court issues a summary order, it may
produce a clear legal obligation—binding one party in litigation,
resolving a case or controversy—but without any explanation of the
reasons behind the decision. Sometimes, the justification is implied in
the outcome, without much reasoning required. But other times, the
principle that informs the rule is quite difficult to divine. To continue
the example from above, when the Supreme Court invalidated the
Environmental Protection Agency’s clean energy plan in 2016, it did so
without explaining itself. 72 The outcome of the case was crystal clear,
but the public was left guessing as to the Court’s justification. 73
To be sure, being unclear about the principle to which one
commits does not necessarily entail being unclear about the specific
obligations imposed by that commitment, only the reasons for or
principles behind the obligation. 74 Indeed, the law regularly imposes
clear obligations while being unclear about the reason—often in order
to maintain a political coalition forged out of an incompletely theorized
agreement. Incompletely theorized agreements are forged when people
converge on particulars, such as the outcome of a particular case, even
if they disagree on first principles upon which the case should be
decided. 75 For instance, twelve jurors may agree that a defendant
should be sentenced to ten years in prison, even if they disagree about
the purpose of criminal punishment. The jury, in underspecifying the
purpose of its criminal sentences, declines to articulate a commitment
to a particular principle—it is inexpressive—thereby enabling
incompletely theorized agreements among those who support the
punishment for different reasons.

72.
73.
74.
75.

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra Section I.B.
Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1735–36.
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C. Publicity (Transparency to Whom)
Reducing the audience size of a statement has a number of
effects. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that fewer people hear the
expression and therefore fewer people are affected by it. If a man speaks
loudly in a crowded room, his statement reaches a greater number of
people than if he had whispered it. But the whisper also alters the
statement. If someone says, “I love you,” to a room full of colleagues, it
has a different meaning than if the same person pulls someone aside to
whisper that phrase. So private messages are not just heard by fewer
people; they also have a different tone than public messages. 76 This is
especially the case where public, large-audience messages are the norm
and the private message stands out as special or distinct. Indeed, when
it was revealed that the National Security Agency had access to a wide
swath of internet communications data, there was outrage about the
fact of the access, but perhaps even more outrage about the fact that it
had been kept quiet. 77
Courts regularly manage the expressive impact of a trial by
reducing the size of its audience. Whether a court decides to broadcast
a trial, for example, is known to have a considerable effect on how many
people the trial reaches. Perhaps most famously, the O.J. Simpson trial
captivated audiences for months, and at least part of the explanation
for this was the presence of cameras in the courtroom, which caught
and amplified the expressive effect of nearly every aspect of the trial. 78
In the international criminal context, a similar effect can be seen. The
Special Court for Sierra Leone has been praised for its outreach efforts,
which included ensuring that its trials were broadcast by television and
radio in both Sierra Leone and neighboring Liberia. 79 While these largevolume approaches have certain benefits, there are also risks. When the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, sitting in The Hague, issued live
broadcasts of the trial of Charles Taylor, for example, it sparked
76. See Tara L. Orchard & A. Daniel Yarmey, The Effects of Whispers, Voice-Sample
Duration, and Voice Distinctiveness on Criminal Speaker Identification, 9 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 249, 249 (1995) (noting the differences in tone in public versus private messages).
77. See Dan Seifert, Secret Program Gives NSA, FBI Backdoor Access to Apple, Google,
Facebook, Microsoft Data, VERGE (June 6, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/
6/6/4403868/nsa-fbi-mine-data-apple-google-facebook-microsoft-others-prism
[https://perma.cc/
F59K-7NWE] (noting that the program, “in action since 2007[,]” was highly classified and “the only
members of Congress that knew about PRISM’s existence were bound by oath not to speak of it
publicly”).
78. See Christo Lassiter, TV or not TV—That is the Question, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
928, 930 (1996) (describing the O.J. Simpson trial as “perhaps the most watched event in history”).
79. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
385 (4th ed. 2011) (“The Special Court for Sierra Leone showed itself to be more engaged with the
local population from the outset of its work.”).
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protests in Monrovia, Liberia. 80 Whatever one thinks about the merits
of doing so, a small-audience approach, one that did not broadcast the
trial on television, may have been less inflammatory.
Courts have other mechanisms for reducing publicity. When a
court decides to hold some aspect of a trial in camera, it reduces the
audience for those aspects of the trial. Criminal courts regularly hear
testimony in camera, or otherwise obscured from the public, out of
respect or concern for the witnesses, despite the considerable expressive
power of witness testimony and the general desire to make trials as
public as possible. 81 The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example,
has ruled that child witnesses always have the opportunity to testify in
camera. 82 This rule is not motivated out of a concern for reducing the
expressive content of this testimony—if anything, the court would likely
prefer to broadcast this vivid and moving testimony far and wide. But
the rule nonetheless reduces the expressive reach of this testimony.
To summarize, the mechanisms for reducing the publicity of
legislation include: not publishing negotiations; having negotiations in
secret; not revealing the identities of the members in a negotiation; not
publishing the normative goals of the law, even if the law itself is made
public; and more. Options for reducing the publicity of an adjudication
include: in camera proceedings; closed courtrooms; media blackouts;
managing outreach campaigns in a way that reveals the outcome of a
trial, but not its jurisprudential goals; and more. Options for
enforcement include: meetings in private—neither the fact that the
meeting has occurred nor its contents are public; meetings in secret—
the fact that the meeting occurs is public but its contents are not; and
monitoring efforts in which the subjects are not named publicly.
Scholars have long documented the important effect that
publicity can have on the law. 83 For example, scholars have examined
how negotiating in secret can change the willingness of parties to

80. See Charles Taylor Verdict: As It Happened, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17852257 [https://perma.cc/5YK6-WH2Y] (“Eager youth
who had gathered all morning to listen to a live broadcast of the trial became angry, saying Taylor
had been cheated. They brandished placards, which read: ‘We love you Taylor, God willing you will
come back,’ and ‘He’s not guilty.’ ”).
81. See Marie-Bénédicte Dembour & Emily Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at
War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 161 (2004) (noting that oral testimony by witnesses is
often foregone in international criminal trials out of concern for witness safety).
82. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses, ¶ 16 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone July 5, 2004).
83. See generally Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006)
(describing the tensions inherent in the concept of open government); Luban, supra note 17, at
154.

Woods_Galley (Do Not Delete)

22

1/11/2018 2:58 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1:1

compromise or posture to constituents. 84 But publicity has largely been
ignored as a component of the law’s expressive—or, in this case,
inexpressive—capacity. If an agreement is not public, or its
enforcement is secret, it cannot express to a broad audience its
underlying set of values or regulatory goals.
D. Attribution (Transparency by Whom)
What kind of statement the law makes also turns on who makes
it. Just as a red shirt makes more of a statement in South Los Angeles
than it might elsewhere, the law makes more or less of a statement
depending on who we attribute the law to, or whether we attribute it to
anyone at all. For example, the expressive impact of a criminal sanction
meted out by the state is different from that meted out by a vigilante
mob. 85 The link between identity and commitment is perhaps most
explicit in public law, where a state formalizes its legal commitments
by signing its name. 86 The very act of signing a treaty, for example, is
considered a significant step by a nation toward adopting an agreement,
despite the fact that signing treaties does not necessarily give them any
legally binding effect in that state’s domestic legal system. 87 Moreover,
even when states comply with the norms in a treaty, and have passed
domestic legislation suggesting that they support the values expressed
by the treaty, treaty signing itself constitutes an important expression
of consent to be bound. 88 In private arrangements, too, parties put a
premium on putting their names and reputations on the line.
84. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
581, 583–85 (2005) (inferring that behavior and agreements change depending on how public they
are). For a review of informal, tacit, and secret agreements, see Charles Lipson, Why Are Some
Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 495–507 (1991). Lipson notes that reduced publicity can
reduce the risk of controversy. Id. at 500 (“[I]nformal agreements are generally less public and
prominent, even when they are not secret . . . Informal agreements can escape the public
controversies of a ratification debate.”).
85. For an account of the rituals undertaken by vigilante mobs in order to appear to have
greater legitimacy—the sort associated with a legitimate criminal justice system—see
CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, THE MANY FACES OF JUDGE LYNCH: EXTRALEGAL VIOLENCE AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 68 (2002) (“Lynchers were no mob, ‘but emphatically the people,’ their
defenders insisted.” (emphasis added)).
86. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Preamble, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 332, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (noting the special role that
treaties play in creating international law and binding states in a system of mutual consent).
87. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14
EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2003) (“As a matter of domestic law, many governments condition their
acceptance of treaty obligations on the passage of implementing legislation.”).
88. In order to be bound by an international agreement, a state must do more than comply;
the state must “express[ly] consent to be bound by a treaty.” Fact Sheet #1: Understanding
International Law, UNITED NATIONS (2011), https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011/
press_kit/fact_sheet_1_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH57-B8JG]. Signature is one way to do this.
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The depth of any particular commitment also cannot be
determined in a vacuum—it too depends on the identity of the person
making the commitment. 89 The expressive nature of a particular
commitment therefore depends on (a) the strength of the commitment
and (b) the identity of the actor making the commitment. 90 For example,
the idea of a people’s right to self-determination has different
expressive content coming from a small country with no colonies than
from a colonial power for whom such an expression would be politically
costly. 91 Regulators can make the law less expressive by modulating
these two features: shielding the identity of the speaker, and reducing
the speaker’s commitment to the principle in question.
In fact, regulators often obscure the specific provenance of a
regulatory law or policy. 92 This can be achieved by shielding the
identities of regulators, or by bundling them into a group, allowing each
to claim that their voice was not the voice expressed by the group. 93 Per
curiam opinions are one example of this phenomenon. Group opinions,
signed by the court as a whole, shield each individual judge from taking
full ownership over the final expression; each judge can later say that
they were outvoted by the group, that their individual voice was
muted. 94 This sort of reticence may be strategically deployed in highly
divisive cases—where the court is concerned with the political
consequences of its ruling. 95 Or it may be done in cases where the judges

See Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, supra note 86, arts. 11–12, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 331;
see also Goodman & Jinks, supra note 87, at 173 (noting that voluntary signature is one way a
state becomes bound to a treaty).
89. See Raustiala, supra note 84, at 584 (“Depth clearly varies for each party to an agreement;
what is deep for one state may be shallow for others.”).
90. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2028 (“When the Court makes a decision, it is often
taken to be speaking on behalf of the nation’s basic principles and commitments.”).
91. This is partly an explanation for why England notoriously opposed any mention in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to people’s right to self-determination. ELIZABETH
BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 187–89 (2005).
92. This is a subject addressed in part by the clarity-of-responsibility literature. See, e.g., G.
Bingham Powell, Jr. & Guy D. Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking
Account of the Political Context, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 391, 391 (1993) (describing how economic voting
depends in part on the clarity of responsibility that voters can ascribe to policymakers).
93. Juries are one common example of a decentralized voice in governance. See CALABRESI &
BOBBITT, supra note 50, at 57.
94. This is why some scholars have argued that per curiam opinions hinder judicial
accountability. See Robbins, supra note 55, at 1212 (“[T]hose opinions that are issued per curiam
cannot have an impact on the author’s public image because the author remains anonymous.”).
95. See id. at 1203 (“At times the per curiam has been a convenient tool for the Supreme
Court in deciding controversial cases . . . .”). It has also been argued that the per curiam opinion
was deployed for just this reason in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). See Linda
Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme Court’s Use of the Per Curiam
Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 569 (2000).
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come from different cultures or even different jurisdictions and seek
acceptance for their ruling among all relevant communities.
The European Court of Justice, for example, exclusively issues
unanimous opinions. 96 The inability of judges to file individual dissents
means that the court speaks with a different voice than if the court
issued a series of different opinions. 97 As scholars have noted,
“unanimous decisions have insulated individual judges from political
pressure from their governments.” 98 Because it is impossible to identify
whether a particular decision was the result of one judge’s efforts or
another’s, none of the judges’ identities is tied particularly strongly to
the court’s opinions. 99 The same dynamic can also be seen, albeit to a
lesser degree, with the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
which files opinions on a consensus format. 100 When the Committee
issues an opinion, it does so as a group, speaking in the more removed
and indistinct voice of the committee. 101
Taking these different aspects of a speaker’s identity together
suggests something like a spectrum, one that runs from one extreme,
where an actor publicly commits to a principle, to the other extreme,
where an actor rejects the principle. In the middle is an actor who
expresses no commitment.

96. There is an in-depth discussion of this practice in Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 326–27
(1997). See also PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (5th
ed. 2011) (describing the opinions of the European Court of Justice).
97. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 326–27 (noting that the unanimity rule “allows the
Court to speak as the uniform and quasi-mystical ‘voice of the law’ ” (quoting Martin Shapiro,
Comparative Law and Politics, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 537, 538 (1980))).
98. Id. at 327 (citing DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 109
(1993)).
99. Because of the court’s exclusive reliance on unanimous opinions, “it is impossible to
accuse a judge of being insufficiently sensitive to national interests or of having ‘let his government
down’, no one outside the Court can ever know whether he vigorously defended the position
adopted by his own country or was in the forefront of those advocating a ‘Community solution.’ ”
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 59 (3d ed. 1994) (cited in Helfer
& Slaughter, supra note 96, at 327).
100. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 343; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus,
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 135 (1993)
(decrying the ambiguity of the European Court of Human Rights’ consensus method and
concluding that “the failure to articulate with precision the scope and function of the consensus
inquiry poses a potentially grave threat to the tribunals’ authority as the arbiters of European
human rights”).
101. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 343 (“The Committee then authors an opinion,
ambiguously referred to in the Optional Protocol as the ‘views’ of the Committee.”).
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TABLE 2: SPECTRUM OF COMMITMENTS
[-1]–––––––––––––––[0]––––––––––––––[1]
[Oppose the Norm] [No Expression] [Support the Norm]

Table 2 models these various ways of modifying a speaker’s
commitment to a particular principle. Position [0] occurs where the
identity of the target of a legal expression is unknown, or where the
identity of the source of a legal expression is unknown, making it hard
to pin them to a particular commitment. 102 Position [-1] occurs where
an actor explicitly opposes a particular commitment. If the actor is
privately motivated to uphold the principle, positions [-1] and [0] both
shield that private motivation from public view. While legal scholarship
suggests that legal obligations are formed and fulfilled at position [1],
this analysis suggests that in fact there is important regulatory activity
that happens at position [0] and even at position [-1].
III. THE TRANSPARENCY TAX
Transparency has costs, both obvious and nonobvious. It costs
something just to announce that a meeting will be public, let alone to
make accommodations for the public at that meeting. 103 But these costs
are largely a matter of resource constraints; with enough resources,
these costs wither. Yet there are other costs, which cannot simply be
paid to go away. Principal among these is that transparency narrows
the range of acceptable interpretations about what the law means.
The law imposes obligations—to do or not do something—but it
also makes a statement about values, and in particular it makes a
statement on behalf of someone. 104 In the regulatory context, this
typically refers to the state of mind of regulators who seek to make a
statement about the normative desirability of some set of actions. Anti102. Many international agreements only concern the parties to the agreement. Here, the
targets of the law are also the source of the law—the states that sign an international treaty, for
example, are also the subjects of the legal regime created by the agreement. It is therefore useful
to distinguish between reticence about the identity of the target of a particular norm and reticence
about the identity of the source of a particular norm. For example, we may distinguish between
hiding the identity of the state proposing a treaty from hiding the identity of a party against whom
some provision of the treaty is being enforced.
103. In California, the state recently suspended a rule that required the posting of agendas of
open-records meetings seventy-two hours in advance of the meeting, which was costing the state
an estimated $96 million to administer. Brian Joseph, Cost to Post Public Meetings: $96 Million?,
OC REGISTER (July 23, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/taxdollars/strong-478849-http-href.html
[https://perma.cc/P5DB-UVQT].
104. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2000) (noting that the label “expressive” “refers to the
ways that an action or a statement (or any other vehicle of expression) manifests a state of mind”).
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smoking campaigns are a classic example. Regulations requiring
tobacco companies to depict cancerous lungs on their cigarette packages
express disapproval of smoking and thereby discourage it; while the
regulation does not prohibit smoking, it expresses a strong statement
of condemnation. 105 Expressive obligations publicly convey a
commitment to a particular principle, the reason for the obligations
being imposed. Expressive commitments are broadcast to a wide
audience and can be seen as characteristic of the actor making the
commitment. Something is expressive, in other words, if it makes a
public statement of commitment to a particular value or regulatory
goal.
This helps to explain why regulators spend a great deal of time
trying to shape the expressive content of their actions. Judicial
opinions, for example, may clarify the law’s obligations, but they also
frequently clarify the reason for the law. But courts do not always issue
opinions, and even when they do they do not always explain their
reasoning. This suggests that judges do not always seek to maximize
expression. Sometimes they choose to be inexpressive.
There are a number of reasons why regulators might choose to
make less rather than more of a statement. Expressive obligations can
be reputationally costly to enter into or to enforce; they can inhibit
incompletely theorized agreements; and they can be inflexible in
uncertain or changing circumstances. Inexpressive obligations promise
to alleviate these concerns. Specifically, semitransparency promises to
buy regulators time, reduce conflict, manage reputational concerns, and
give actors a measure of plausible deniability. What follows, then, is a
catalogue of the way that transparency makes the law more expressive
and therefore more costly.
A. Crowding Out Effects
Clear expressions of commitment to a particular norm on behalf
of a particular actor can crowd out alternative explanations for what
the law means. For example, while many people agree that a criminal
defendant should be punished for his crimes, they may disagree about
the reason. 106 Some may think he deserves the punishment as a moral
matter; some think his punishment is an important step for community
healing; some think it is a deterrent to future criminals; and so on. If

105. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1025–34
(1995) (explaining the effects of social disapproval on behavior).
106. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment (Special Court for Sierra
Leone Mar. 2, 2009).
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the court expresses a public commitment to a singular sentencing goal,
it threatens the viability of this rough coalition of support for the
conviction. 107 Clarity about the purpose of sentencing could even
provoke backlash. For example, imagine a criminal court issuing a
sentence explaining that the defendant’s actions violated community
norms and were morally repugnant, and that the defendant therefore
deserved moral condemnation. 108 Such language of moral righteousness
could embolden and even entrench the defendant’s partisans. Judges
might fear that this could undermine their goal of conflict resolution. 109
There may still be good reasons for moral condemnation, but this at
least suggests a plausible explanation for why judges might choose not
to explain themselves fully. 110
The above example shows crowding out effects when there is
excess transparency about the reasons for the law. But crowding out
effects also happen when there is excess transparency about who is
behind the law. Suppose, for example, that legislators pass a bill that
grants asylum to undocumented immigrant workers. The bill is made
possible by a coalition of pro-business Republicans, who are responding
to their constituents’ desire for immigrant labor, and Democrats, who
are responding to their constituents’ demands for immigration
reform. 111 Suppose also that in a politically divisive climate, it is costly
107. The idea that political consensus is possible because of coalitions of overlapping consensus
is famously captured by Rawls’ concept of overlapping consensus. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 133–
72; see also Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1735 n.8 (discussing the difference between overlapping
consensus and incompletely theorized agreement).
108. This is precisely what concerns Dan Kahan about retributive punishments. Dan Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 422 (1999). This problem is perhaps
especially stark in international criminal cases. In the so-called “CDF trial,” the Special Court for
Sierra Leone described the court’s sentencing goals as retributive, calling for “appropriate
punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender.” Prosecutor v. Fofana,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment of the Sentencing of Monina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶ 27
(Special Court for Sierra Leone Oct. 9, 2007) (citing R. v. M., [1996] S.C.R. 500, ¶ 80 (Can.)). This
is a common scholarly view. See Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International
Criminal Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF
LAW 373, 387 (Goran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009) (suggesting that genocide and crimes
against humanity are “moral catastrophes deserving of the highest condemnation we can muster”).
109. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert,
52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 670–71 (2012) (explaining that backlash from public opinion can undermine
a judicial regime’s legitimacy).
110. This contravenes the suggestion that international judges should more clearly articulate
the reasons for their decisions. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 364 (explaining that
international judges do not always articulate overarching methodology for balancing concerns).
Kahan proposes that deterrence is unique among criminal law theories for its ability to mute
cultural conflict. See Kahan, supra note 108, at 422 (explaining the problem that cultural conflict
presents for expressive criminal sanctions).
111. This is hardly an exotic hypothetical. See George C. Edwards III, Staying Private, in
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 275, 279–280 (Nate Persily ed., 2015)
(describing how after failed public meetings, President Clinton met privately with Republicans in
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for Republican and Democratic representatives to be seen collaborating
with the enemy. In such a scenario, legislation may only be possible
where there is imperfect attribution about who is behind the law.
Maximal transparency—the kind that might reveal the political rivals
who gave rise to the bill—would crowd out alternative explanations
about where it came from.
One might resist this conclusion, since surely partisans will
know what is really happening and see through the attempt to elide the
reason for or source of the law. Perhaps. But plausible deniability is
powerful. Semitransparency can give an actor enough plausible
deniability needed to please two audiences at once. Consider the
example of Facebook operating in repressive states. Human rights
groups have been pressuring Facebook to abandon its “real name”
policy—which prohibits user aliases—on the grounds that such policies
are bad for human rights activists in repressive regimes. 112 Facebook
has resisted these efforts, insisting it is a politically neutral platform
for communication, rather than a human rights technology. 113 However,
there is evidence that the firm has privately taken steps to create
aliases for democracy activists in authoritarian states. 114 Such a
situation may actually be optimal for activists: Facebook says they will
not go out of their way to help human rights activists, thereby making
it less likely that the online service will be blocked in repressive
regimes, where the company can engage in foot-dragging and other
steps to resist government requests for information that ultimately
benefit activists. 115 Assuming that Facebook and related services would
be kicked out of the repressive regime if they announced their
Congress, which “made it easier for both sides to compromise,” giving Republicans the freedom to
characterize the negotiations as a win on spending cuts, while Democrats could claim a victory on
Medicare and other welfare programs).
112. See Letter from Ken Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Watch, to Mr. Mark Zuckerberg,
Chairman and CEO, Facebook, Regarding Human Rights Considerations Before Entering China
Market (June 3, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/03/letter-mr-mark-zuckerbergchairman-and-ceo-facebook-regarding-human-rights
[https://perma.cc/KNB4-GH53]
(asking
whether Facebook would alter its real name policy if the company were to enter China).
113. Verne G. Kopytoff, Sites Like Twitter Absent from Free Speech Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2011, at B4.
114. See Alexis Madrigal, The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-insidestory-of-how-facebook-responded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044/
[https://perma.cc/F9VK-8KZC]
(explaining Facebook’s involvement with political protest pages in Tunisia).
115. There is some evidence that Facebook has at the least dragged its feet in shutting down
anonymous accounts created by democracy activists in the Middle East—despite the company’s
otherwise very swift removal of anonymous pages. See Mike Giglio, ElShaheed: The Mysterious
“Anonymous” Behind Egypt’s Revolt, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 30, 2011, 6:45 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/elshaheed-mysterious-anonymous-behind-egypts-revolt-66697
[https://perma.cc/4LPE-ZXJU] (discussing the anonymous Facebook page administrator
ElShaheed).
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commitment to helping human rights activists, those activists should
prefer that Facebook be either inexpressive or hypocritical about
human rights. Not only is Facebook better situated to provide services
if they are in a country, but the aliases that activists seek are worth
more if no one knows they are aliases. In this scenario, Facebook’s
reticence about online activism gives it a measure of plausible
deniability to tell the repressive state that it is not directly inciting
activism there.
One would think that the failure to openly commit to a set of
norms is meaningless if everyone knows that the same commitment has
been made privately. Yet in many areas of governance, there is a
powerful distinction between what is publicly known but not admitted,
and what is formally admitted. 116 Moreover, law and policy decisions
implicitly acknowledge this distinction. For example, when National
Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden released documents
revealing that the United States had inserted surveillance devices
inside foreign embassies, it sparked a diplomatic uproar. 117 But long
before these revelations, it was well known that states bugged each
other’s embassies. 118 What explains the sudden uproar about a widely
known phenomenon? One explanation is that with these revelations,
the United States loses plausible deniability. This loss is enough to
raise the profile of the issue, and to give groups an opportunity to
express outrage, even though they were likely already aware of the
practice.
B. Raising Reputational Costs
Reputational sanctions are thought to be one of the core
mechanisms through which expressive commitments work. Asking
parties to make public commitments to clear norms—and naming and
shaming them for violating those commitments—is premised on the

116. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 564 (2013) (noting that “the lack of
official acknowledgement is considered a key foreign policy advantage of planting information
about the drone program” because it preserves plausible deniability about the program).
117. See Stephen Castle, Report of U.S. Spying Angers European Allies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/europe/europeans-angered-by-report-of-usspying.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/HXC8-U5UR] (describing the effects of secret surveillance
by the NSA).
118. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Listen Carefully: Bugging Foreign Embassies is Nothing New,
GUARDIAN (July 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/bugging-foreignembassies-nothing-new [https://perma.cc/52MT-GXGK] (describing examples of spying at foreign
embassies).
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idea that high audience costs make for stronger commitments. 119 When
audience costs for violating a commitment are significant, commitments
are thought to be more credible because subjects face a penalty if they
renege. 120 This suggests that expressive commitments are more credible
the more powerful the audience is, and the more the commitment is
seen as characteristic of the state, something for which they can be held
accountable later. 121 Presumably, the more public the expression, the
bigger the audience will be. Similarly, the clearer the expression, the
clearer it is to identify a violation, and the stronger the commitment,
the higher the cost for violating the commitment. Expressive
agreements therefore have higher audience costs than their
inexpressive alternatives in at least three ways.
Public commitments and high audience costs can be salutary
once the agreement is formed. Moreover, a public commitment, even a
disingenuous one, can benefit from what Elster calls the civilizing effect
of hypocrisy. 122 But at the agreement formation stage, demanding an
expression of public commitment may raise audience costs to the point
that an actor will not sign on—an actor who might have otherwise
committed. If the reputational costs are too high, or appear
unmanageable to a potential signatory, they can impede agreement.
This may explain the goal of the broad yet vague commitment
expressed by the UN’s corporate norms initiative. 123 The
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) taking part in that initiative
are beholden to several constituencies—donors, the board, other
NGOs—and cannot appear to make too many concessions to the desires
of corporations. Demanding that they publicly commit to a set of
principles that appear corporate-friendly, even if those principles
constitute a reasonable compromise, might impose too high a

119. See generally James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577, 585 (1994) (describing finding that indicates
higher audience costs lead to democracies being less likely to “back down”). This idea enjoys some
empirical support. See Michael Tomz, Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations, 61 INT’L
ORG. 821, 821 (2007) (using public opinion surveys to show that domestic audiences care about
their country’s international reputation and therefore disapprove when a leader reneges on an
international commitment).
120. Fearon, supra note 119, at 585 (“[W]hen large audience costs are generated by escalation,
fewer escalatory steps are needed credibly to communicate one’s preferences.”).
121. See Jessica L. Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve, 62
INT’L ORG. 35, 35–36 (2008) (summarizing the widely held view that democracies have a signaling
advantage over autocracies because of their accountability to the domestic electorate, and showing
that autocracies are more beholden to a small but powerful domestic audience than previously
thought).
122. See JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 341 (1999)
(explaining the benefits of any public commitment).
123. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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reputational cost for the NGO. Likewise, directors of public corporations
may want to commit to a set of norms—again, some reasonable
compromise position—but they have their own reputational concerns.
The corporate board or shareholders may punish a director who appears
to make too many unnecessary concessions. If reputational costs for
either group become too high, agreement will be difficult. Moreover,
once agreement has been reached, a public commitment may make
some officials reluctant to change course even in the face of changed
circumstances, if doing so would incur audience costs. 124 This suggests
that there are times when reputation can actually get in the way of legal
compliance; in these times, regime designers may attempt to be
inexpressive, if doing so reduces the reputational costs of compliance.
The concept of “face” is roughly the idea that social interactions
can increase or decrease one’s standing in society. 125 For a party that
wants to achieve a certain legal change, without appearing to do so
because of the associated face costs, keeping some aspects of the
lawmaking process private can allow for face-saving measures. For
example, the parties developing legislation may be well served by
keeping some aspects of the negotiations private, thereby allowing each
party greater flexibility to frame the legislation in terms favorable to
their own constituents. This could call for, among other things, an
agreement to keep the legislative history classified for a set number of
years after the law is enacted. While many legal institutions feature
some form of secrecy, like the Minister’s Council of the European
Central Bank, the legislative history is typically immediately
published. 126 Face-saving measures are standard in negotiation
training, but rarely considered in the context of lawmaking. 127
Semitransparency, in other words, promises some relief from the
reputational costs of more open regulatory action. Expressive
124. See David Stasavage, Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and
International Bargaining, 58 INT’L ORG. 667, 682–83 (2004) (citing Jon Elster’s work on
deliberation in democracy).
125. Erving Goffman, On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, 18
PSYCHIATRY 213, 213 (1955).
126. For example, the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute, the treaty that created the
International Criminal Court, have been published online by the United Nations. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html (last
updated Dec. 19, 2003) [https://perma.cc/A4JV-KP4R].
127. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. FOLGER ET AL., WORKING THROUGH CONFLICT: STRATEGIES FOR
RELATIONSHIPS, GROUPS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 147 (5th ed. 2005) (giving a useful overview of the
concept of positive and negative face in negotiations); Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson,
A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory
and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1060–65 (2004) (describing how theories of saving and losing
face can inform analyses of the proper role of emotions in law); Roger J. Volkema, The Mediator as
Face Manager, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1988, at 5 (describing how emphasis on dignity of the parties
in negotiation—on face management—increases a third-party mediator’s effectiveness).
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commitments can be reputationally costly because they are made to a
large audience, and are seen as broadly characteristic of the actor
making the expression, putting the actor’s reputation on the line.
Inexpressive strategies mitigate these concerns by modulating how
specifically an actor commits to a particular principle, by reducing the
size of the audience, and by reducing the extent to which the actor’s
identity is on the line—by making an expression as a group, say—or by
offering some other form of anonymity. This is not to say that
inexpressive strategies do not have their own costs as well. Being too
inexpressive might raise a separate set of suspicions. 128 But since the
general thrust of the transparency literature is on the costs of too little
openness, what follows is an account of one set of costs associated with
too much transparency.
Taking an actor’s reputation out of the equation—presumably
by reducing transparency—not only can make agreement more likely,
but it can also enhance deliberations by reducing the chance that
negotiators will posture. Political scientists have shown through real
world examples and formal models how full transparency in
deliberations can increase the chance that deliberators will posture to
please their constituents, even when they know that doing so leads to
the wrong outcome. 129
Mitigating reputational costs is also crucial for the monitoring
and enforcement of international law. One of the more plausible
explanations for why an armed group would meet with the Red Cross
in a secret meeting is the promise that upon leaving the meeting, the
armed group can manage any reputational costs of meeting with the aid
group. The armed group might say the meeting never took place, or they
might say they took the meeting only to spit in the face of the
imperialist pigs—both of which would give them cover to implement
humanitarian principles without incurring reputational harm. The Red
Cross has a long history of confidentiality, and this credibility breeds
trust—a crucial determinant of the ICRC’s success. 130 This may be true
for other institutions seeking to manage reputational costs.
Reducing reputational costs by shielding the source of a
particular regulatory policy can also allow actors to experiment with
128. See LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA ET AL., The Election of 1800, on HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN
MUSICAL (Atlantic 2016) (“Jefferson has beliefs, Burr has none.”).
129. See Andrea Prat, The Wrong Kind of Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862, 869 (2005)
(“[An] agent who knows that his action is observed has an incentive to behave in a conformist
manner.”).
130. See Ratner, supra note 11, at 303 (“While confidentiality is often crucial for access, the
parties may be more motivated to grant access due to trust in the even-handedness and experience
of the ICRC.”).
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novel regulatory arrangements. For example, the Chinese government
is widely thought to be experimenting with free speech policy in Hong
Kong. 131 This is a relatively costless way for Beijing to experiment with
different approaches to free speech reform, a particularly sensitive
topic. It allows the government to test new policies and, if they fail,
Beijing can simply say that Hong Kong’s free speech policies do not
reflect formal state policy. If they succeed, Beijing can take credit for
the reforms and apply them elsewhere.
Semitransparency can also sidestep controversy where an actor
fully and publicly expressing commitment to some principle is
controversial. Sometimes controversy springs as much from the person
expressing a thing as from the thing itself. That is, the identity of the
actor—state or organization—proposing or promoting a particular legal
obligation may, in some cases, undermine its cause.
For example, even critics of the consensus requirement of the
Human Rights Committee—which encourages the Committee to speak
as a group, and which discourages the filing of individual dissents—
acknowledge that the requirement has provided the court a measure of
political stability. 132 Similarly, the Council of the European Union,
which does not release meeting minutes, can insulate members from
external political pressure that might arise from public knowledge of
their individual support for Council policy. 133 The same rule is used by
the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. It is critical in
that context because the members of the bank’s Governing Council are
selected by their home states. While they are tasked with developing
policies that would help the Eurozone as a whole, they have strong
professional incentives to appear to privilege their home state. 134
Keeping meeting notes secret has been credited with a partial solution
to this problem: if the Council issues a policy that is good for Europe but

131. See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Fault Lines Laid Bare in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/world/asia/08iht-letter08.html?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/PYP7-2A68] (reporting on an incident of street shouting in Hong Kong).
132. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 361 (explaining that the adoption of the
consensus requirement has made an important contribution to the Committee and its political
consistency).
133. See Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference?, supra note 20, at 3
(“[T]ransparency can also have costs involving increased incentives for representatives to posture
and to ignore private beliefs about appropriate policies.”).
134. See Prat, supra note 21, at 100–01:
At this stage, they are still secret, and there is a strong rationale behind such a policy.
If the discussions at meetings were public, it is feared that national members would
have an incentive to pander to their home audiences by taking adversarial stances,
which would make the decision-making process slow and cumbersome.
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politically bad for one state, that state’s representative on the Council
can say, “I tried my best.” 135
There is experimental support for the idea that audiences will
judge a particular policy proposal differently depending on who
expresses it. For example, experiments have shown that when
Americans thought an arms control treaty was proposed by President
Reagan or by neutral analysts, they were much more likely to support
it than when it was proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. 136
Another study showed that Israeli Jews evaluated an actual Israeliauthored peace plan less favorably when they thought it was proposed
by Palestinians rather than by its true authors. 137 This “reactive
devaluation” is a well-documented phenomenon. 138 An inexpressive
agreement design might minimize the voice behind a particular norm
by obscuring the parentage of a proposed agreement or settlement. This
would require devising a mechanism for shielding—to the extent
possible—the identity of the party announcing or proposing an outcome
that requires purchase from diverse stakeholders.
C. Reducing Flexibility
Asking for a public expression of commitment to a singular
principle may make it hard for actors to change course later, even where
changing course is desirable. In areas where norms are evolving
rapidly, for example, insisting on a public commitment to a crystallized
norm could draw battle lines prematurely. For example, if the State
Department asks an armed group like the Taliban to commit publicly
to a singular set of norms, this could backfire, enhancing the Taliban’s
anti-Western credibility, and foreclosing a potentially useful dialogue.
Such a dialogue could produce information about Taliban practices, and
it preserves the option for later influence should the Taliban’s
willingness to comply with the law change. In these times, regulatory
bodies may prefer to adopt vague norms to preserve flexibility in
uncertain or fast-changing circumstances. This is precisely the benefit
135. Id.
136. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 29–30 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
137. Ifat Maoz et al., Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” v. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal, 46
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515, 521–26 (2002).
138. Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 126–27 (Edward S. Reed et al.
eds., 1996) (summarizing the psychological literature describing reactive devaluation—the
phenomenon by which “[t]he evaluation of specific package deals and compromises may change as
a consequence of the knowledge that they actually have been put on the table, especially if they
have been offered or proposed by one’s adversary”).
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that the European Court of Human Rights is thought to enjoy by its
slow, consensus-based approach to case law. 139
Unclear expressions can preserve flexibility in agreement
design. In the early stages of agreement formation, the terms, the
membership, and other details are sometimes left undetermined. 140
This lack of specificity not only preserves flexibility about what is
required by subjects of the regime, but it also preserves flexibility about
what kind of statement the regime makes. For example, while
consumers, oil companies, and environmentalists may agree that
greenhouse gases are a pressing concern, and may even agree that it
requires a global regulatory approach, they will not necessarily agree
about the solution. 141 Reducing the specificity of the obligations
required by a new regime promises to at least maintain the possibility
of a mutually agreeable regulatory approach. It also avoids signaling an
explicit regulatory goal that might dissuade would-be subjects from
joining the regime. Insofar as these vague requirements do not make a
statement about the goals of the regime, they are mechanisms for
reducing the expressiveness of the regime. As this discussion suggests,
increasing vagueness in legal expressions has some of the same
qualities that make soft law more desirable than hard law, such as
reducing contracting costs, reducing sovereignty costs, allowing actors
to be more adaptable in uncertain conditions, and encouraging
compromise. 142
Semitransparency may allow actors to govern—by establishing
a rule—but leaving some things unclear to be clarified later. This can
be valuable when multiple communities’ norms conflict but convergence
is desirable. By not articulating a legal norm with such specificity to
preclude one of several communities’ norms, regulators may buy time
during which the differences between communities can be mitigated.
Vagueness about principles may buy time when parties need more of it
to agree on shared norms—whether this agreement is achieved through

139. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 317 (“The conjunction of the margin of
appreciation doctrine and the consensus inquiry thus permits the ECHR to link its decisions to
the pace of change of domestic law, acknowledging the political sovereignty of respondent states
while legitimizing its own decisions against them.”).
140. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 433 (2000) (explaining that “writing complete contracts is
extremely difficult” and costly and therefore states write incomplete contracts, delegating to others
the task of completing them).
141. See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE
TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING (2001) (explaining why the Kyoto Protocol was unlikely to effectively
combat climate change).
142. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 140, at 434–50 (summarizing the benefits of laws whose
requirements are not clearly defined).
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a social process, such as socialization or acculturation, through
domestic political channels, or because of material changes over time. 143
This may be especially true when a community’s views on a
particular topic are evolving over time. 144 By entering a new area of the
law slowly—by not articulating norms, or by articulating them at a level
of generality that is high enough so as not to offend key coalition
factions—lawmakers may buy enough time to generate consensus. 145 As
Calabresi and Bobbitt said about opinions that were so muddled they
stood for nothing:
When a court is working its way toward a new doctrine but does not yet know which of
various competing principles will be appropriate, the opinion which does not stand for
anything, if used sparingly, may be the least willful step the court can take. It may permit
the court to test the water without imposing its will on later courts. 146

This is very explicitly the aim of the European Court of Human
Rights’ margin of appreciation doctrine, which seeks to give member
states time to coalesce around a single norm. The Court acknowledges
that the European states within its jurisdiction may approach novel
questions of law differently; in these cases, the court occasionally
applies a wide “margin of appreciation” and elects not to express an
opinion on a particular matter.
The scope of the margin of appreciation afforded by the Court is
inversely proportional to the amount of consensus among European
states as to the practice in question: where there is little consensus
among the states, the court is likely to afford a wide margin of
appreciation, and where there is a high level of consensus among the
states, the margin is reduced. 147 In Frette v. France, for example, the
Court ruled that France was reasonably entitled to consider the
interests of the child in rejecting a homosexual man’s application for
prior authorization to adopt a child, noting:
143. For an overview of the mechanisms through which international law affects state
behavior, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 630–56 (2004).
144. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1749 (“[I]ncompletely theorized agreements may be
valuable when what is sought is moral evolution over time.”).
145. This may also explain the European Court of Human Rights’ consensus method, which
some criticize for its ambiguity. See Helfer, supra note 100, at 135 (decrying the ambiguity of the
European Court of Human Rights’ consensus method and concluding that the “failure to articulate
with precision the scope and function of the consensus inquiry poses a potentially grave threat to
the tribunals’ authority as the arbiters of European human rights”).
146. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 50, at 211 n.39.
147. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 843, 851 (1999) (“In the jurisprudence of the ECHR, consensus is
inversely related to the margins doctrine: the less the court is able to identify a European-wide
consensus on the treatment of a particular issue, the wider the margins the court is prepared to
grant to the national institutions.”); see also Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 128;
Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9–10 (1988).
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Since the delicate issues raised in the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is little
common ground amongst the member States of the Council of Europe and, generally
speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, a wide margin of appreciation
must be left to the authorities of each State. 148

The margin of appreciation doctrine has been praised for buying
the court time when consensus is emerging or evolving. 149 As Neuman
notes, “given the [Court’s] practice of an evolutive interpretation of
human rights, a wide margin of appreciation for issues on which states
are highly divergent allows the court to postpone a definitive response,
and then to adopt a more progressive interpretation after substantial
convergence has occurred.” 150
D. Reducing Healthy Hypocrisy
One of the things that transparency seeks to eliminate is
hypocrisy—saying one thing but doing another. 151 But there are times
when the optimal regulation would require regulators to say one thing
publicly and do another privately. 152 For instance, negotiators have long
known of the “no negotiating with terrorists” paradox: security forces

148. Frette v. France, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 369.
149. See Helfer, supra note 100, at 135 (noting that “[n]early all those offering commentary on
the Court and Commission have viewed this evolutionary interpretation as beneficial to the
development of Convention case law”). The margin of appreciation doctrine has also been critiqued
as moral relativism. See Benvenisti, supra note 147, at 851–52 (noting that minority moral values,
which are not reflected in national policies, are the “main losers” under the margin of appreciation
doctrine).
150. Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 376 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
151. Hypocrisy is a pervasive phenomenon in public life, but it rarely features in discussions
of public law, except in the form of blanket critiques. There is insufficient room for a full normative
defense of hypocrisy here, but the key distinction is not one between hypocritical statements and
honest ones, but instead between good and bad sorts of hypocrisy. For a discussion of useful (or
normatively defensible) sorts of hypocrisy in regulation, see DAVID RUNCIMAN, POLITICAL
HYPOCRISY: THE MASK OF POWER FROM HOBBES TO ORWELL AND BEYOND 7–11 (2008)
(summarizing the treatment of hypocrisy by political theorists going back to Hobbes, and noting
that the relevant question is not whether hypocrisy is acceptable, but instead teasing out the
different sorts of hypocrisy so that one might “take a stand for or against one kind or another, not
for or against hypocrisy itself”). It is worth noting that the “saying you don’t so that you can”
phenomenon described here is the inverse of the hypocrisy that Judith Shklar found objectionable.
See JUDITH SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 47 (1984) (hypocrisy is pretending that one’s “motives and
intentions and character are irreproachable when [one] knows that they are blameworthy”).
152. Calabresi and Bobbitt call this subterfuge, which they suggest allows them to manage
tragic choices. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 50, at 57–58 (noting that by providing no
reasons for its decisions, “a responsible agency . . . avoids, or at least mitigates, the conflict
between the wish to recognize differences and the desire to affirm egalitarianism in all its forms”).
The same concept appears in international law. See Benvenisti, supra note 147, at 852 (reviewing
the European Court of Human Rights’ margin of appreciation doctrine and noting: “The consensus
rationale, it is suggested, is but a convenient subterfuge for implementing the court’s hidden
principled decisions”).
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say they do not negotiate with terrorists, but most of them do. 153 This
“acoustic separation” between what the public thinks the rule is and
what the rule is in practice enables the dual benefit of deterring
hostage-taking as a general matter while also allowing for behind-thescenes negotiations to diffuse any particular hostage situation. It may
even be the case that the no-negotiating with terrorists policy makes
the negotiations easier to conduct, because hostage-takers will have no
set expectations for the negotiation and may even feel fortunate that
security forces have broken their policy to negotiate this one time. 154
Torture may be similar: the former director of the CIA has suggested
that torture is not necessary to interrogations, but that having
detainees believe that it is possible is what allows the CIA not to need
it. 155
This sort of hypocrisy raises a host of other concerns, but it is
useful to illustrate an extreme example of how an actor can conceal
their normative and legal commitments in order to take steps to fulfill
them. 156 In some cases, actors say nothing, or even claim to reject a
particular norm, in order to take steps to fulfill it. In addition to
reducing the clarity and volume of an expression, then, an actor may
seek to support a norm without publicly linking their identity to that
support. International relations scholars have focused considerable
attention on audience costs and the challenge of speaking to both
international and domestic audiences. 157 However, these accounts focus
largely on managing two audiences, rather than saying one thing to one
in order to do the complete opposite for another, so they do not explicitly
capture this phenomenon of “saying you don’t so that you can.”
153. See Peter R. Neumann, Negotiating with Terrorists, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 128,
128 (“When it comes to negotiating with terrorists, there is a clear disconnect between what
governments profess and what they actually do.”).
154. It may be the case that even though everyone knows that security forces negotiate with
terrorists, all they need is plausible deniability to maintain this advantage. See infra Part IV for
a discussion of plausible deniability.
155. General Michael Hayden, former Dir., CIA, Remarks at Duke Law Center’s LENS
Conference (Apr. 13, 2012); see also Interview with General Michael Hayden, former Dir., CIA, in
Stanford, Cal. (May 14, 2013).
156. Some of the concerns raised by hypocrisy—such as the lack of transparency—do overlap
with concerns raised by other forms of reticence, which I explore infra Part V.
157. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Integrating International and Domestic Theories of
International Bargaining, Introduction to DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 3, 15–17 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) (describing a
Janus-faced executive who plays domestic and international audiences off of each other:
“[D]omestic policies can be used to affect the outcomes of international bargaining, and . . .
international moves may be solely aimed at achieving domestic goals”); Robert D. Putnam,
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988)
(describing how diplomats must play a game where they send signals to both international and
domestic audiences).
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IV. TAX-FREE TRANSPARENCY
The tax for maximalist transparency policies is a loss of
expressive ambiguity; there is simply less flexibility to manage optics
as transparency increases. But transparency is critical to good
governance. Is there a way to ensure the benefits of transparency
without paying the tax? This Part argues that there is: maximizing
obligation transparency provides many transparency benefits without
the tax; maximizing the other transparency types does not. That is
because the clarity with which the law specifies its obligations has little
independent effect on what sort of statement the law makes.
Suppose for a moment that the law operates on just two axes:
legalistic and expressive. The legalistic dimension refers to what the
law requires—its obligations, their specificity, and so on—while the
expressive dimension refers to optics—the law’s ability to make a
broader statement about some principle or regulatory goal. Often, the
law is both highly legalistic and highly expressive. For example, when
the Supreme Court struck down state laws that limited marriage
licenses to heterosexual couples, 158 the Court was legalistic insofar as it
imposed an obligation on the states, 159 and it was expressive insofar as
it publicly and ceremoniously announced a commitment to marriage
equality. 160 But the law is not always maximally legalistic and
maximally expressive. On the legalistic axis, law’s obligations can be
softened by making them less specific, less binding, and less reviewable.
Indeed, there is a rich body of scholarship about soft law. 161 And on the
expressive axis? This Article shows that while law has an expressive
capacity, it has a corollary capacity for reticence. Indeed, regulators
often elect to be reticent rather than expressive.
This has a number of implications for regime designers. The first
is that law’s expressive and legalistic dimensions can be decoupled—
that is, the law might be expressive but soft, or reticent but hard. Table
3 below outlines four possibilities, leading to a broader set of regulatory
options than just the choice between hard or soft law.
158. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
159. See id. at 2607–08 (noting that states must grant same-sex marriage licenses).
160. See id. at 2599–2601 (declaring the Court’s commitment to four principles underlying the
fundamental right to marry).
161. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61
STAN. L. REV. 573, 574 (2008) (“Soft law has taken the legal academy by storm.”). “Soft law” is in
some ways an incoherent concept, but it generally refers to the idea that law is some combination
of less specific and less binding. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International
Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 174 (2010) (describing the many definitions of soft law, but
noting that the majority of them focus on rules that are nonbinding); Raustiala, supra note 84, at
582 (noting the incoherence in the term).
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TABLE 3: HARD/SOFT V. EXPRESSIVE/INEXPRESSIVE
Hard

Soft

Expressive
Clear and binding legal
obligation that publicly
conveys a clear commitment
to a particular principle
(e.g., anti–flag burning
statute)
Unclear or nonbinding
legal action that publicly
conveys a clear commitment
to a particular principle
(e.g., anti-smoking
campaigns, executive
signing statements)

Inexpressive
Clear and binding legal
obligation that does not
publicly convey a clear
commitment to a particular
principle (e.g., judicial
stays)
Unclear or nonbinding
legal action that does not
publicly convey a clear
commitment to a particular
principle (e.g., Kyoto
Protocol and many
international agreements)

Second, there are times when creating, adjudicating, and
enforcing the law is less costly when it is done in an inexpressive
fashion—that is, while maintaining some opacity about the law’s
meaning. 162 Scholars widely assume that soft law is less costly to create
and enforce than hard law. 163 But sometimes just the opposite is true:
specific and legally binding rules can be less expressive and therefore
less costly to accede to than a hortatory standard that imposes vague
requirements but expresses a clear commitment to a costly principle. 164
An actor might find it easier to comply with a strictly binding
requirement that does not communicate a willingness to compromise
user privacy than to comply with a soft obligation that loudly expresses
the firm’s willingness to work with the government. Optics matter, and
sometimes they are the primary obstacle to adherence with the law. So
while one might imagine that one reason soft law is less costly to
implement than hard law is because it signals less of a firm
commitment to some principle, this Part shows that is not the case. In
fact, soft law often makes more of a statement than hard law. In other
words, there is no direct relationship between obligation transparency
and the other transparency types.
162. See infra Section IV.B.
163. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 84 (1966) (“[V]ague demands,
though hard to understand, can be less embarrassing to comply with.”); Abbott & Snidal, supra
note 140, at 434–50 (describing the benefits of softer forms of legalization, including lower
contracting costs); Gersen & Posner, supra note 161, at 594 (“The first advantage of soft laws is
that they can sometimes accomplish what hard laws accomplish but at a lower cost.”).
164. For evidence that rules say less about their purpose, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1690 (1976). The idea that political
compromise can be forged around specific rules that do not reveal their purpose comes from
Sunstein.

Woods_Galley(Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/11/2018 2:58 PM

THE TRANSPARENCY TAX

41

A. Tax-Free Obligation Transparency
1. Nonbinding Obligations
There is no clear relationship between the softness of law and
how much of a statement it makes. Some soft law makes quite a big
statement. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
widely regarded as nonbinding, but when its norms are violated
activists can build headline-grabbing social movements. 165 The
Declaration asks states to ensure the human right to health, an
obligation that is both vague and nonbinding: there is no consensus
about what a state must do to fulfill the right, and the provision is
widely regarded as soft law. But the obligation is expressive: it requires
signatories to publicly commit to particular principles that have
considerable meaning. Not all soft law is expressive. For example, when
the Securities and Exchange Commission issues a no action letter, this
is soft law that clarifies an actor’s obligations, but it likely does not
express a commitment to particular principles. 166
This is not to say that the degree of an obligation’s softness—
whether something is binding or not—cannot affect its expressiveness.
Sometimes the fact that an obligation is legally binding will express a
stronger commitment to a given principle than if the same obligation
were nonbinding. 167 This may be especially true where a binding
agreement, such as a treaty, is more widely publicized than a
nonbinding agreement. 168 But one could not predict whether a given
obligation is reticent or not—whether it expresses a commitment to a
clear principle—by asking whether the obligation is binding.
The conclusion that nonbinding rules can have specific and
distinct expressive content confounds scholarship that suggests that
reducing the binding nature of an agreement increases flexibility and

165. See BORGWARDT, supra note 91, at 264 (noting that despite being “toothless—
unenforceable in any court of law,” the Universal Declaration of Human Rights retains a “moral,
cultural, and even political grip”).
166. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 945–46 (1998)
(discussing the finality of no action letters).
167. See JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (2005) (“A
final reason to choose a treaty over a nonlegal agreement is to convey the seriousness of a state’s
commitment to the agreement.”).
168. See Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and
Beliefs 1 (Feb. 11, 2008) (unpublished paper), https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzIntlLaw-2008-02-11a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UBR2-ASJE]
(“By
publicizing
international
commitments and embedding them in a legal framework, treaties raise the reputational ante,
making it more costly to renege.”).
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buy-in. 169 Soft law scholars suggest that reduced legality is less
threatening and less likely to engender opposition than a harder, legally
binding alternative. 170 This may be true all things being equal, but all
things are rarely equal: for some agreements, parties will be much more
concerned about the signal their commitment sends than about whether
they are technically bound by the obligation. For example, states that
oppose a right to freedom of speech are unlikely to adopt an agreement
that expresses such a value, even if the agreement is nonbinding and
nonspecific. Reticence, therefore, is not synonymous with softness.
Rather, reticence suggests another distinct component of legal
obligations that might inform both the design of agreements and
compliance efforts.
This suggests that scholars may be paying comparatively too
much attention to whether an agreement is legally binding and not
enough attention to whether that agreement signals a commitment to
a principle beyond whatever obligations it imposes. The expressiveness
of both nonbinding norms and binding law can be modulated downward
by reducing the clarity of the principle being expressed. Rather than
“softening” law in order to increase buy-in, scholars and regulators
could imagine ways to make law more taciturn; and rather than
imagining law hardening over time, we can imagine law being more
expressive—expressing more of a commitment, to a clear principle, and
to a bigger audience.
2. Vague Obligations
One way to be reticent is to be vague about the principle to which
one is committing. 171 But there is a crucial distinction between a vague
obligation and articulating a vague reason for that obligation. 172 The
following table illustrates the distinction between the clarity of an
obligation and the clarity of the reason for the obligation. While legal
scholars have largely focused on the former, reticence operates on the
latter.
169. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 140, at 436–37 (noting that “[a]ccepting a binding legal
obligation, especially when it entails delegating authority to a supranational body, is costly to
states,” and that reduced legal obligation is another way to reduce those costs).
170. See id. at 434–35 (discussing how making nonbinding soft law allowed lowered
contracting costs and enabled agreement in the ILO and the OECD).
171. See supra Section III.A.
172. There is a rich literature on ambiguity of legal obligations, but this literature has focused
very little on the expressive impact of ambiguity. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity
About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2–3
(2010) (surveying the literature on statutory ambiguity and noting that there is no consensus about
whether ambiguity means “difficult to interpret” or “could be interpreted multiple ways”).
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TABLE 4: CLARITY OF OBLIGATION V. CLARITY OF SIGNAL EXAMPLES
Clear Signal

Opaque Signal

Clear Obligation

Sentencing Decisions
(with reasons); Treaty
Chapeaux

Judicial Stays; Denials of
Certiorari; Per Curiam
Opinions

Opaque Obligation

Presidential Signing
Statements; Sense of
Congress Statements

Classified Office of Legal
Counsel Opinions

It is not always the case that reduced clarity about legal
obligations expresses less about the normative foundations of the law.
The classic distinction between rules and standards suggests that
standards are vaguer than rules as to what they require, 173 but knowing
that something is a standard or a rule does not on its own tell us
whether that rule or standard will express a commitment to a clear
principle. For example, imagine a principle that holds that the wealthy
should pay their fair share of taxes. Now imagine a legislator choosing
between a specific rule (“those who make more than $250,000 per year
must pay forty percent of their income in taxes”) and a vague standard
(“the wealthy must pay a substantial portion of their income in federal
taxes”). The standard in this case is vaguer than the rule, but neither
one is expressive of the fairness principle. We might have to dig a bit to
find out the purpose. What does the legislative history say? Is the bill
called the “Pay Your Fair Share” bill? Then we might know that the
purpose is fairness. Without that insight, however, both the rule and
the standard are ambiguous as to whether they reflect a concern for
fairness, redistribution, a growing government deficit, and so on.
This complicates the story told by scholars who suggest that
vague standards are more flexible—and easier to impose—than specific
standards. 174 This flexibility is because “precision narrows the scope for
173. See Kennedy, supra note 164, at 1687–1701 (detailing the various forms that rules can
take). I recognize that there is a complex theoretical underpinning behind the distinction between
principles, rules, and standards. For my purposes, I will say that a principle is the reason for the
rule or standard (where rules and standards are more or less specific as to what they require).
174. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 404–
08 (2000) (describing the reasons why regimes modulate the levels of precision, obligation, and
delegation in a particular international legal agreement); see also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al.,
Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 72–
82 (2012) (summarizing research into several aspects of the design of international agreements,
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reasonable interpretation.” 175 The distinction between obligations and
the reasons for those obligations suggests that this statement is
incomplete. Precision narrows the scope of interpretation as to what is
required by a particular obligation; but precision might also widen the
scope of interpretation about why it is required.
Indeed, it may be that there are times when there is an inverse
relationship between the specificity of the law and the values it
expresses. While rules are clearer than standards as to their
requirements, they can be less clear as to their underlying rationale.
For example, a standard that requires drivers to “drive through
intersections safely” reveals more about its purpose than a more precise
rule requiring that “drivers must stop at stop signs.” 176 The standard is
evidently motivated by a concern for safety; the rule could be motivated
by other concerns, such as modulating the flow of traffic, encouraging
foot traffic, or boosting shopping. The rule enables safety advocates and
shop owners to forge an incompletely theorized agreement because it
does not make a clear statement of its purpose; the standard may not
generate the same agreement.
3. Narrow Obligations
Narrow obligations may say less than broad obligations simply
by virtue of the fact that they do less. The agreement to ban child
soldiers discussed above is an example of a narrower rule that says less
than a broader, vaguer standard. Yet reducing the scope of an
expression does not necessarily make it reticent. In fact, saying more
can lead to an expression of commitment to ambiguous principles. Being
ambiguous—giving too many reasons for doing something—is just as
effective at masking the particular motivation as being vague, or not
giving a clear enough reason to do something. In both cases, the
expression is not particular.
Broad obligations can be expressive. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is broad as to the issues it addresses, yet expressive

including legalization, precision, delegation, and membership, and noting in particular the
different treatments of agreement ambiguity).
175. Abbott et al., supra note 174, at 412.
176. The authors of the IO special issue on legalization also discuss an example using driving
behavior: A precise rule is not necessarily more constraining than a more general one. Its actual
impact on behavior depends on many factors, including subjective interpretation by the subjects
of the rule. Thus, a rule saying “drive slowly” might yield slower driving than a rule prescribing a
speed limit of 55 miles per hour if the drivers in question would normally drive 50 miles per hour
and understand “slowly” to mean 10 miles per hour slower than normal. Id. at 412 n.26. The
authors use this example to show that, as to what it requires, a rule is not necessarily more
constraining than a flexible standard. Id.
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of a clear commitment to a set of principles. But broad obligations can
also be reticent. Consider the agreement that companies accede to when
they adopt the UN’s principles of corporate responsibility. The
agreement is broad—touching on labor rights, human rights, and
more—yet it imposes so few specific obligations and says less about its
purpose than the predecessor corporate norms initiative. By leaving the
determination of many of the details of the broad framework as well as
the expressive content of membership unfinished, the UN Special
Representative who created the framework was able to achieve
consensus where previous efforts had failed. 177 In 2011, the Human
Rights Council endorsed the framework. 178 Many of the groups that had
previously opposed the effort—both corporate groups and human rights
groups—now embrace the broad framework (albeit for different
reasons). 179 This analysis suggests that breadth can affect
expressiveness. Generally speaking, narrow agreements will express
less than broad ones. But the breadth of an obligation—its operative
scope—is not perfectly predictive of its expressive content.
B. Other Avenues for Avoiding the Tax
Nearly any regulatory action is an opportunity to be more or less
expressive. Regulators can modulate how expressive any given act is by
doing or neglecting to do any of the following: publish best practices, 180
issue no action and interpretive letters, 181 criticize rule violators, 182
make statements in court, 183 and so on. Even the design choices that go
into building a court, such as where it should be located, how open it
should be, and whether trials will be publicly broadcast are
177. See John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 n.2, 37 &
nn.178–79 (2008) (discussing the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights’ proposal “set[ting] out sweeping human rights duties for corporations”).
178. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011).
179. See JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
105 (2013) (detailing the comments of various representatives’ reactions to the Human Rights
Council’s Resolution).
180. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 295–96 (2006) (describing how
publishing best practices is an alternative form of regulation to rules-based regulation).
181. See Nagy, supra note 166, at 929 (discussing the SEC’s use of interpretive letters).
182. These may include NGOs reporting on a particular actor, as when Human Rights Watch
issues a report criticizing a state or other actor for their human rights record on a particular
subject. For an example, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIKE A DEATH SENTENCE: ABUSES AGAINST
PERSONS
WITH
MENTAL
DISABILITIES
IN
GHANA
6–7
(2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ghana1012webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVX7CQQU] (criticizing Ghana for its treatment of people with mental disabilities).
183. See Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function,
49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1039–44 (1999) (giving an overview of how courts express normative
positions through judges’ statements, witness testimony, and more).
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opportunities for expression. 184 A fuller list of the mechanisms available
to modulate regulatory expressions appears in the table below; this list
is meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive.
TABLE 5: EXAMPLES OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING
EXPRESSION
Legislation
- transparency of
negotiations (content)
- transparency of
negotiations (parties’
identities)
- statements of intent
- declarations
- secret ballots

Adjudication
- court mission
statements
- victim impact
statements
- victim testimony
- public outreach
campaigns
- public access to trials
- public statements by
judges
- public statements by
prosecution/defense
- what remedies?
- remedy explanations

Enforcement
-

-

-

are monitoring efforts
open to the public?
are shaming efforts
conducted publicly?
are violators
individually named?
compliance notices:
public announcements
by subjects insisting
they are not bound, or
emphasizing their
support
enforcement directed
at subject directly or
through intermediary?

Scholars largely treat expression—and by implication,
inexpression—as a byproduct of regulatory obligation, and as a result
it is rarely considered an explicit element of regime design. 185 Yet as the
list in Table 5 suggests, there are many policy levers for managing the
extent to which a particular law or policy makes a public statement of
commitment to a particular principle. These levers are available to
regulators legislating, adjudicating, and enforcing the law. For
example, the potential parties necessary to support a particular law
may negotiate differently if their negotiations are—or will be—open to

184. Courts express themselves in several ways, including choices in the design of the
openness of the court, so that a witness’s testimony is broadcast throughout a country or heard
only by the judge and counsel in camera. For a review of the decision to allow cameras into a
criminal trial in Florida, see Joseph A. Boyd, Jr., Cameras in Court: Estes v. Texas and Florida’s
One Year Pilot Program, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815, 819–21 (1978).
185. See, e.g., Geisinger & Stein, supra note 8, at 115 (failing to consider expression as an
explicit element of regime design).
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the public. 186 Adjudicatory bodies are similarly equipped with a range
of options for managing the expressiveness of their actions. For
example, a court must decide whether, in addition to arriving at a given
outcome, its decisions should make a statement about deeper policy
goals or justice values. If a criminal tribunal justifies its sentencing
practices in a sentencing opinion, it can make a statement about the
purpose of criminal punishment. The court can further amplify or
change that statement through outreach efforts. Finally, efforts to
monitor and enforce agreements can be more or less expressive.
Enforcement bodies have a choice whether to make their monitoring
efforts public; whether to identify the subjects of their investigations by
name; and whether to criticize those subjects publicly. Each of these
choices presents an opportunity for expressing one’s commitment to a
particular principle; conversely, each choice presents an opportunity for
avoiding the transparency tax.
V. TRANSPARENCY TRADEOFFS
The previous Part argued that much of the transparency tax can
be avoided by privileging transparency of obligation over other
transparency types. But there are other tradeoffs to keep in mind. This
Part offers several key distinctions that may matter to designing
sensible transparency policies.
A. Reasons to Pay the Tax
Even though transparency imposes a tax on governance, there
are times when it still makes sense to pay that tax. Sometimes we
explicitly want the kind of expressive clarity that comes with
maximalist transparency policies. Other times we simply cannot
achieve the benefits of semitransparency without other countervailing
costs, like self-dealing. As will become clear, I am not referring to the
costs of being secretive or of hiding the law, which are well
documented. 187 Rather, I am interested in the costs that occur precisely
because regulators sought to avoid paying the tax—sought, in other
words, to maximize expressive ambiguity.

186. See Karin Aggestam, Two-Track Diplomacy: Negotiations Between Israel and the PLO
Through Open and Secret Channels, in 3 DIPLOMACY 51 (Christer Jönsson & Richard Langhorne
eds., 2004).
187. For a summary, see David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 278 (2010)
(noting that state secrecy inhibits input, oversight, and criticism, and therefore often leads to
lower-quality policies).
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1. Opportunity Costs
The most obvious shortcoming of an inexpressive approach is the
opportunity cost of not expressing something. 188 One of the central
justifications for existing laws is that they express an important set of
principles. 189 This expression is thought to affect international and
domestic politics, and to put would-be norm violators on notice of basic
community norms. 190 This may be lost under a less transparent
approach.
One opportunity cost arises when actors miscalculate the actual
costs that expression would produce and therefore needlessly opt for
reticence. For example, developed states might propose an inexpressive
approach to environmental standards if they think that this is the only
way to get developing countries to accede—perhaps because the
developing countries are wary of domestic political costs of appearing to
bow to developed country interests, or appearing to sign on to a set of
standards that could slow economic growth. But if this is wrong—a
simple miscalculation either by the developing countries about their
own domestic political costs, or by the developed countries in the first
place—it may unnecessarily forgo the benefits of expression. In this
scenario, reticence may operate like a kind of chilling effect: states
needlessly adopt an inexpressive strategy simply out of fear of the costs
of expression.
Still another possibility is that too much clarity about the law’s
meaning would result in backlash, which could have unintended,
salutary consequences. To extend the hypothetical, imagine that the
developed and developing countries agree to a set of highly expressive
environmental standards, and that one developing state’s expressive
commitment to these standards produces enormous backlash in the
domestic industrial sector. This backlash presents both an opportunity
and an obstacle. Political scientists and legal academics have shown
that political opportunity structures can be created when laws are seen

188. To some, expressing moral norms is the very goal of justice, regardless of costs and
benefits. Scholars are divided between those who see legal expressions as a means to a regulatory
end, and those who see expressions as ends unto themselves. For a description of this divide, see
Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1624–25 (1998).
189. See Kwoka, supra note 3, at 1361 (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act was
passed in order to increase government transparency).
190. See Mirjan R. Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.KENT L. REV. 329, 346–47 (2008) (arguing that the best justification for the international criminal
system is its expressive function—its capacity to express the normative goals of international
justice).
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as controversial or unpopular. 191 Environmental groups that might
previously have been unable to get any public attention or media
coverage in their debate with industrial groups may enjoy new
platforms for advocacy. 192 Expressive commitments also have the
benefit of creating clubs—separating out the super committed parties
from the less committed. 193 And controversial legal expressions can gain
buy-in over time, giving them ex-post purchase. 194 These benefits are
lost with a more cautious, inexpressive strategy.
These missed opportunities can offend constituencies as well.
There is a growing interest in the relationship between the law and
public opinion. 195 The previous Part outlined several reasons to think
that reticence might enable actors to avoid saying something that might
offend a particular constituent. 196 But even if reticence avoids a harmful
outcome with one audience—domestic or international—it may produce
harms with another audience. By not expressing certain norms, a
regulator may lose legitimacy with some core constituency, even if
reticence would achieve some short-term strategic goal or please
another constituent. The Red Cross, for example, has been heavily
criticized for its reluctance to reveal information about ongoing
humanitarian abuses, let alone to condemn them, and may only be able
to withstand this criticism because of its relatively unique and
independent structure. 197 Membership organizations, like Amnesty
International, may be more inclined to express moral outrage—a
commitment to principle that will please funders—even where doing so
191. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with
Human Rights Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 725, 734–37 (2008) (describing how international
commitments can shape domestic political opportunities).
192. It is worth noting that these political opportunity structures do not have an obvious
political valence. The same scenario could occur in the reverse, where the offended group is a
member of civil society and the group enjoying a new political opportunity is an industry player,
or even where the two groups are competing members of civil society or competing corporate
interests.
193. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 140, at 429 (“[S]tates should find hard law of special
value when forming ‘clubs’ of sincerely committed states, like the EU and NATO. Here legalization
functions as an ex ante sorting device . . . .”).
194. See Tom Ginsburg, The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court, 9
CHI. J. INT’L L. 499, 512–13 (2009) (applying David Law’s concept of judicial power to the
International Criminal Court to support the idea that controversial opinions can, if they are
complied with, provide focal points that change expectations about the court’s power).
195. See, e.g., KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW
HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 2–5 (2013) (describing a
theory of how domestic constituencies operating through domestic political channels play a key
role in the spread of global norms).
196. See supra text accompanying note 120.
197. This was especially true in the aftermath of the Holocaust. See Irvin Molotsky, Red Cross
Admits Knowing of Holocaust During the War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 1996), http://nyti.ms/10y6yEu
[https://perma.cc/HBP2-2EHN].
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undermines some organizational goal. 198 Reticence can undermine
credibility with constituents who expect a certain expression of loyalty
to shared principles. 199
2. Gaming
Semitransparency can also incentivize actors in harmful ways.
This risk of gaming is not unique to reticence—gaming is a challenge
for expressive strategies as well 200—but it is a significant one. The
strategies described above can help an actor to further some regulatory
goal without publicly making a statement of principles; this is desirable
where making such an expression would undermine or impede that
regulatory goal. But there is a risk that actors will use reticence as an
excuse to avoid ever making commitments to principle.
Consider, for example, an environmental initiative with
corporate and NGO members trying to determine whether to allow
“silent partners”—members of the initiative whose involvement is kept
secret. In the best-case scenario, silent partnership would induce actors
to join who might otherwise not join. For example, a corporate executive
might seek to improve her company’s environmental practices but be
fearful of a board that takes a skeptical view of environmentalism. But
in the worst-case scenario, silent partnerships create a considerable
moral hazard. A corporation could pose as a reformer for
environmentalists—appeasing corporate antagonists for some period of
time—without offending other constituents. They get the chance to
appear to do something in private without actually doing anything, and
without taking any public risks.
Moreover, what incentive would other companies have to join
the initiative as named partners? All members might prefer to be silent,
making only private, hard-to-verify commitments to reform. They could

198. This would mirror the analysis of any principal-agent situation, where the agent’s
deliberations are public. See Stasavage, Polarization and Publicity, supra note 20, at 60 (“Publicity
of debate may prompt representatives to use their actions or statements as signals that they are
being faithful to constituent interests.”).
199. Silence can lead to suspicion. See HONORÉ DE BALZAC, PÈRE GORIOT 22 (A.J. Krailsheimer
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1835) (“According to the logic of the empty-headed who disclose
everything because they have nothing to say that matters, those who do not talk about their affairs
must necessarily be doing badly.”).
200. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1941 (2002) (“When countries are rewarded for positions rather than effects—as they
are when monitoring and enforcement of treaties are minimal and external pressure to conform to
treaty norms is high—governments can take positions that they do not honor, and benefit from
doing so.”). But see BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 59–67 (2009) (arguing that international treaties are expressive of state
preferences, and are not just cheap talk).
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implement only superficial changes and, in exchange, gain information
from competitors and civil society critics. One of the benefits of the
expressive approach is that public commitments encourage a wide
audience to monitor an actor’s fealty to the actor’s word. Public
commitments also happen to be sticky. 201 An inexpressive system may
not allow the same public verification process, and the commitments
may not stick.
To the extent that reticence means reducing transparency, it
raises a host of related concerns. 202 In most of the examples above, the
intentions of one or both parties were assumed to be consistent with
regulatory goals. But surely there are times when a party’s interests or
intentions are not aligned with regulatory goals. Imagine a voluntary
initiative launched by several little-known NGOs and a handful of large
oil companies. Such an initiative could be a novel new reform initiative
with great promise, or it could be a front for industry-wide collusion;
how would anyone know? The initiative could simply declare that
secrecy is necessary to achieve consensus on important and sensitive
matters like environmental reforms and then, behind closed doors, each
member organization could agree to serve each other’s interests,
whether or not those interests furthered the stated aims of the
initiative.
3. Agency Costs
Transparency is one mechanism for enabling principals to
monitor agents. 203 Because inexpressive actors are opaque about their
goals, they present potential agency costs. 204 For example, when the
President enacts secret policies, her constituents have a hard time

201. See ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 92–103 (1st ed. 1985)
(summarizing research showing that people who commit and have their commitment publicized
are more likely to keep their commitment, even after the publicity is over).
202. See, e.g., Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in
International Law, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 1; Jutta Brunnée
& Ellen Hey, Transparency and International Environmental Institutions, in TRANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 23; Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martínez, Transparency in
International Financial Institutions, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at
77.
203. See Prat, supra note 129, at 862 (“There is a widespread perception, especially among
economists, that agency relationships should be as transparent as possible.”); see also Luban,
supra note 17, at 154 (cataloguing the many exceptions to the publicity principle).
204. See Jacques Crémer et al., Language and the Theory of the Firm, 122 Q.J. ECON. 373, 374
(2007) (explaining that agents that use vague language impose costs on the firm). For an overview
of principal-agent problems, and an analytic framework for distinguishing different sorts of agency
costs, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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evaluating those policies. 205 The risk of agency failure is especially
prominent in the corporate world. 206 For example, say that
environmentalists decide to allow an executive from a public
corporation to quietly join their environmental initiative. 207 Even if this
is not problematic from their perspective, it may still be problematic
from the perspective of the board or the shareholders. Commitments
made to the initiative may constitute material information that the
executive should disclose to shareholders. And even if it does not fall
under any particular disclosure rules, there are still good reasons for
the shareholders to prefer the chance to be able to monitor their agent’s
actions in the corporation. 208
B. Three Key Distinctions
How one evaluates these costs may depend on a number of key
distinctions. For example, it may matter who is being opaque and why.
We might also think there is a meaningful difference between opacity
at the agreement formation stage and at the enforcement or
adjudication stage. Even if we welcome some opacity early on as
negotiators are crafting a treaty—because, for example, it enables
parties to forge an incompletely theorized agreement—we may not
welcome it later, at the adjudication stage, if it means that a court will
issue a sentence without full or clear justification. Or we might embrace
judicial reticence in some cases—such as in the European Court of
Justice, where the claims are inter-state—but not in others, like
individual criminal trials, where the individual right to due process

205. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I. Steinzor, The People’s Agent: Executive Branch Secrecy
and Accountability in the Age of Terror, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 100 (2006) (applying
agency theory to evaluate the risks of rising executive branch secrecy as a result of
counterterrorism policy).
206. See Prat, supra note 129, at 862 (stating that “violations to the transparency principle
are so widespread . . . [in the corporate world] that some legal scholars argue secrecy is the norm
rather than the exception in the relationship between shareholders and managers”).
207. This is a continuation of the earlier example. The environmentalists may only be
interested in this scenario as a last resort—if silent or secret membership is the only way to induce
the executive to join the initiative.
208. While managers are generally expected to share material information with shareholders,
they are allowed to ask for nondisclosure agreements and in some cases to withhold confidential
trade secrets or other information that would harm the company if leaked. See Cyril Moscow,
Director Confidentiality, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 201, 208 (2011) (noting that when
“[f]aced with an inspection demand, corporations often seek to withhold some information as
confidential or demand confidentiality agreements as a condition of inspection” and concluding
that “[m]aterial information encompasses both proprietary information, such as trade secrets, and
board information, such as the content of board discussions. As in most business situations,
express contractual consent is the best solution to the problem of disclosure of information.”).

Woods_Galley(Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/11/2018 2:58 PM

THE TRANSPARENCY TAX

53

may trump any of the potential benefits of reticence. 209 This Section
offers a first take on these distinctions—distinctions that will be critical
to a fuller normative analysis of reticence.
1. Ex Ante v. Ex Post
Inexpressive lawmaking may be distinguished from
inexpressive law enforcement, and the desirability of the former may be
different from the latter. For example, we may have no problem with
sealing the negotiating history surrounding a treaty for twenty years,
if doing so is likely to make negotiations smoother and more likely to
encourage buy in and broad agreement. But embracing reticence at that
stage does not require us to embrace reticence in trials, if we think that
reticence in that context would mean running roughshod over
important principles of justice.
Note that one’s preferences for or against reticence ex ante or ex
post will not necessarily track one’s ex ante or ex post preferences for
other features of the law such as softness or vagueness. For example,
scholarship on rules and standards focuses on how standards may be
desirable at the agreement design stage, because they reduce
contracting costs—because there is less work to be done in finding focal
points of agreement—but that rules may be preferable at the law
enforcement stage, where they are easier to administer than standards
that require judgment and interpretation. 210 Reticence may track these
preferences—reticence may reduce costs ex ante but not ex post, much
like standards—but not necessarily. It is just as likely that these
preferences will run the other way. Inexpressive lawmakers may prefer
rules to standards ex ante if those rules provide for clear and mutually
agreeable obligations but express little commitment to clear legal
principles. Later, in the ex post law enforcement stage, inexpressive
regulators may prefer standards to rules, if those standards create a
wider range of acceptable behavior, thereby enabling some flexibility in
enforcement and allowing for face-saving enforcement strategies.
Prescriptive and normative analyses, therefore, must be attentive to
this ex ante/ex post divide.

209. Compare supra text accompanying notes 42–43 (describing the reticence of international
criminal tribunals), with supra text accompanying note 88 (describing the reticence of the
European Court of Justice).
210. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
568–71 (1992) (demonstrating that rules are more costly than standards to generate, but that
standards are more costly to interpret and enforce).
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2. Differently Situated Actors
How we feel about opacity in a given context may depend on who
is withholding something and why. There is a meaningful difference
between a technology company refusing to commit to free speech
principles in order to deceive a repressive regime—and thereby ensure
freedom of expression in that regime—and a judge declining to explain
fully the reasons behind her sentencing decision in a criminal trial. For
some, the meaningful distinction between these scenarios is the
motivation of the actors. If the technology company’s motivations are
pure and the judge’s motivations are impure, that will be enough for
some to justify reticence in the former case but not the latter. For
others, the difference will turn on the likely outcomes in each case—if
reticence produces a good outcome in one scenario and not in the other,
it will be worth it in that scenario but not the other.
It may also matter whether the inexpressive actor is a part of
the legal regime or a subject of the regime. That is, we may find
reticence acceptable when the person being inexpressive is a subject of
the legal regime—such as an armed rebel group that meets with UN
monitors to discuss its compliance with humanitarian law. But
defending the rebel group’s reticence in this context does not require a
defense of reticence on behalf of the regulators. We might conclude that
the UN monitors will be under a duty to publicly express condemnation
of the rebel group, even if they secretly tell the rebel group that they
understand the group’s need to reject humanitarian principles even as
they improve their humanitarian practices.
Finally, it may matter who is not being inexpressive. It may be
the case that how one feels about an actor’s reticence depends on
whether others are inexpressive or expressive in the same scenario. For
example, the ICRC may benefit from reticence precisely because they
stand out as an inexpressive alternative in an otherwise expressive civil
society. In this case, if their reticence is critical to their considerable
success, we may be willing to accept some level of reticence for this
considerable success. But in other scenarios, if all actors are being
inexpressive and there is no expressive action, we may decide that
actors have a responsibility to be expressive and that reticence is an
abrogation of that responsibility.
3. Bright Lines
While for some the acceptability of opacity may depend on the
actors and their motivations, for others it will only be acceptable as long
as it does not run afoul of certain bright lines. For example, some may
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feel that the demands of justice call for maximizing expression in
individual criminal trials, where due process requires fully developed
reasons for criminal sanctions, regardless of their costs or benefits. This
is not an instrumental calculation, but a deontological one. Others may
see transparency as simply too important a value—in absolute rather
than relative terms—to balance against some prospective gains
generated by a secret agreement or secret enforcement strategy. 211
These are not fully developed normative arguments against opacity.
Instead, they are offered here to suggest that while this analysis largely
focuses on costs and benefits, these are not the only concerns at stake.
C. Making Sensible Tradeoffs
Can regulators know—with a sufficiently high level of
confidence—whether to prefer more or less transparency in a given
situation? In the absence of this certainty, it may make sense to identify
tools to balance the need for transparency with the need for opacity. The
crucial question may not be whether to be transparent or opaque, but
rather when and how to be one or the other. We already live in a world
of semitransparency. A court, for example, will issue a scathing and
expressive opinion one day, and a less expressive, per curiam opinion
the next—or the court may decline to reach the normative issues in the
case at all. 212 What follows are several policies that promise to balance
the interests of openness with the interests of opacity.
1. Delayed Transparency
Transparency tradeoffs change over time. Secrecy is critical for
sting operations, for example, which simply cannot work effectively if
they are publicized in advance. 213 The same is true for peace
negotiations and controversial legislation. 214 We moderate the harmful
211. See, e.g., Kevin R. Davis, Kantian “Publicity” and Political Justice, 8 HIST. PHIL. Q. 409,
413 (1991) (“All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent
with publicity.” (citing IMMANUEL KANT, ON HISTORY 129 (Lewis White Beck ed., Lewis White
Beck et al. trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1963) (1795))).
212. Consider the European Court of Human Rights. Commentators have suggested that the
court sometimes fully explains itself—and each judge explains his or her reasoning—while other
times the court operates by consensus, conveying little about the individual judges, and at still
other times the court relies on the “margin of appreciation” doctrine to decline to rule on an issue
at all. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 96, at 317.
213. See Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy: The Dilemma of Accountability, 114 POL.
SCI. Q. 181, 182 (1999) (“[D]emocracy requires publicity, but some democratic policies require
secrecy.”).
214. Id. (describing temporary secrecy in the production of the Dayton Accords, President
Clinton’s health care bill, and President Kennedy’s nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union:
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effects of secrecy in these contexts by making it temporary. 215 Rather
than face an absolute choice between total transparency and total
secrecy, regulators instead choose to keep a policy secret for a limited
period of time. 216 This practice of placing a sunset provision on a closed
policy can also be stated the other way around, as placing a sunrise
provision on the policy—a provision that makes a policy more
transparent over time.
So in areas where some opacity is warranted—committee
meetings, when the Justices deliberate, and so on—the harmful effects
of that opacity might be mitigated with sunrise provisions that make
meeting minutes public after some reasonable delay. This would allow
regulators a measure of flexibility in negotiations, but also allow voters
a measure of transparency and a vehicle for accountability.
One could imagine this being useful in private ordering as well.
For example, a social norms initiative that is forged among unlikely
allies—allies who might only sign on if they can remain anonymous—
could slowly become more public over time as the strength of the
initiative grows. A sunrise provision could minimize the twin harms of
(a) expressing norms that might crowd out potential partners too soon
and, conversely, (b) not expressing anything at all, discouraging people
from joining the initiative in the first place. One option would be to
make only vague expressions initially, above some minimum threshold
that would incentivize parties to join the group, but below some
maximum threshold beyond which parties cannot form incompletely
theorized agreements. The group could then progressively become more
public and more expressive as the strength of the initiative grows. This
could mean increasing, over time, the public and expressive nature of
group membership, membership commitments, group principles, and
more. Such time-lapse exposure could offer the benefits of reticence in
the early stages of norm and institutional development, without
foreclosing the benefits of norm expression at a later point in time. It is
worth noting that the same is true for rule enforcement and monitoring
efforts: even if the norms and principles are stated publicly, the nature
and scope, and even the existence, of enforcement measures could be
kept private.
“The most familiar examples are in foreign policy and law enforcement. If the Dayton negotiations
on Bosnia had been open to the press and all the terms of the final agreement fully disclosed, the
leaders would almost certainly not have been able to reach an agreement.”).
215. Id. at 184 (“The first way in which secrecy may be moderated involves its temporal
dimension. We moderate the secrecy by making it temporary: lift the veil in time for citizens to
judge the policy or process.”).
216. The Senate’s most recent attempt to reform the tax code featured a similar proposal.
Bernie Becker, Tax Writers Promise 50 Years of Secrecy for Senators’ Suggestions, HILL (July 25,
2013), http://goo.gl/gBQfCj [https://perma.cc/3QGN-WDTD].
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While scholars have paid considerable attention to sunset
provisions in the law and other time-based rules like re-ratification
requirements, they have paid scant attention to sunrise provisions. 217
Even if some regulation is initially devised in secret, it can be adopted
with an implicit or explicit understanding that it will become
increasingly public over time. This can be managed with a timetable for
increasing publicity—further revealing the substantive obligations of
the law, the delegation provisions, the monitoring and oversight
provisions, the parties to the agreement, and so on.
2. Internal Checks
One mechanism to address both gaming and agency costs is to
create systems for verifying private commitments through a trusted
third party. In the national security context, for example, voters rely on
inspectors general and other internal executive branch checks to ensure
the proper balance between secrecy and accountability. 218 Voters rely
on external checks as well. These checks promise to balance secrecy
with accountability—albeit imperfectly—as when, for example, the
executive meets with the intelligence committees or submits material
to a judge in camera. A similar phenomenon exists in the corporate
world, when shareholders rely on members of the board to monitor the
corporation—including reviewing secret materials, such as trade
secrets—while the shareholders themselves never have access to those
secret materials. 219
There are good reasons to worry that safeguards like these will
be ineffectual, or worse. They could induce trust where it is not
warranted and enable parties to deceive their agents further or engage
in more deceptive gaming. How well this mechanism works is not
clear. 220 But at the very least this approach promises to help regulators
better balance the demands of expression and reticence.

217. See Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 549, 549 (2005) (surveying a random sample of international agreements and finding a link
between uncertainty and duration provisions, suggesting that states put finite durations on
agreements to ensure flexibility in the face of uncertainty).
218. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, at 99–120 (2012) (reviewing the role of inspectors general and other internal accountability
mechanisms within the executive branch); see also Pozen, supra note 116, at 45 (discussing
scholarship about executive branch self-binding mechanisms).
219. See Prat, supra note 129, at 862 (noting that many scholars consider secrecy the norm
between shareholders and managers in the corporate world).
220. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National
Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2013) (discussing the ways in which inspectors
general oversee executive power and increase transparency of national security practices).
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3. Acoustic Separation
Another way that legal regimes manage conflicting interests—
including balancing the interests of transparency with the interests of
secrecy—is by maintaining a wall of acoustic separation between
different audiences. 221 For example, a judge might think that juries
have the right to nullify a decision on any grounds—and the judge will
enforce any decision handed down by the jury—but society is best off if
this right is not explicitly communicated to the jury. 222 Or take
Bentham’s famous example using the death penalty: Bentham argued
that lawmakers might desire the death penalty’s strong deterrent effect
but also find capital punishment morally repugnant. 223 In this case,
lawmakers could say that they will hang criminals, but when someone
is actually convicted they are told they must go into hiding and never
tell anyone what has happened or they will be killed. 224
Reticence can create situations of acoustic separation—when
regulators are inexpressive, the public is not told what regulators think
or know. Acoustic separation is defensible in a limited number of cases
with certain conditions. The normative analysis of acoustic separation
could therefore be useful for thinking about when reticence is
acceptable. For example, Thompson argues that acoustic separation is
only acceptable when it enhances policy, when citizens have an
opportunity to evaluate that policy, and when it is publicly justified.
This might suggest that secret deliberations, like those of the European
Central Bank’s Governing Council, are acceptable if they meet these
criteria, and perhaps reticence is unacceptable where it fails to do so. 225
In situations of acoustic separation, regulators rely on informal
means of conveying information through backchannels, such as leakers.
This suggests that in some cases, the ideal balance between reticence
and expression is informal expression and formal reticence. This can be
managed by leaking or “winking” mechanisms where regulators refrain
from expressing something publicly, but find a way to convey that
information to a select few who can distribute it more broadly.

221. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 634 (describing acoustic separation between the “public” and
“officialdom”).
222. Id. at 635 n.21.
223. Thompson, supra note 213, at 186.
224. Id.
225. See Stasavage, Polarization and Publicity, supra note 20, at 59 (using principal-agent
models to show that in some scenarios optimal decisionmaking occurs when deliberations are
secret but outcomes are not).
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CONCLUSION
While transparency has well-known benefits, it also has
significant costs. Specifically, transparency reduces ambiguity about
what the law means—it reduces the range of values that the law might
possibly express—alienating potential supporters. This is not to say
that this cost is high enough to counsel against transparency on the
whole, but it is a cost to consider. In considering these costs, it helps to
note that transparency is not monolithic; rather, there are a number of
different ways that the law can be more or less transparent. The law
may impose clear obligations, but for unclear reasons; it may be open to
some audiences, but not others; and it may emanate from an unknown
source.
Not only are these types of transparency conceptually distinct,
but they have different tradeoffs. Reductions in obligation
transparency, for example, are more costly than reductions in
attribution transparency or justification transparency. This suggests,
contrary to established wisdom, that clear obligations can be less costly
for parties to support than unclear “soft” obligations, as long as the clear
obligations obscure the principle or actor behind them. It may very well
be the case that the costs of too much transparency pale in comparison
to the costs of insufficient transparency on the whole. But because the
transparency tax has received so little attention, it is taken for granted
that more transparency is always better. Sometimes, along certain
dimensions of transparency, more is less and less is more.

